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The Curious Case of the Missing Legal Analysis
Lynn D. Wardle*

I. INTRODUCTION
The decision of the Vermont Supreme Court in Baker v. State,1 may
be one of the most celebrated judicial decisions in recent history. In
Baker the court held that the Vermont marriage law allowing only malefemale couples to marry violated the “Common Benefits” Clause of the
state constitution, and that same-sex couples must either be allowed to
enter marriage or some alternative union with legal status and benefits
substantially equivalent to marriage. In the first two years and eight
months since that decision was rendered in December 1999 until the
week of this symposium, Baker was cited in at least 266 law review or
journal articles.2 Nearly two-thirds of those publications (167 articles, 63
percent of the total) can be described as supporting, lauding or endorsing
the result, while just ten percent of the articles (27 pieces, 10 percent of
the total) express any significant negative criticism of the decision
(mostly raising separation of powers concerns).3 By any standard, six-toone is a very successful approval ratio. Unquestionably, Baker has been
very popular with the literati of the law profession – mostly law
professors and law students who write in law journals and law reviews.
While Baker has been cited an extraordinary number of times in law
reviews and journals, it has also been cited in ten cases in the first thirty-

This paper was presented at “The Future of Marriage and Claims for Same-Sex Unions Symposium”
on August 29, 2003 at the J. Reuben Clark Law School, on the campus of Brigham Young
University. The article is part of this special symposium issue and the views expressed herein are
those of the author and do not represent the views of the Journal of Public Law, the J. Reuben Clark
Law School, or Brigham Young University.
*
Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT. This
article was presented as a paper at the Symposium on The Future of Same-Sex Marriage Claims: The
Third Generation and Beyond, held at the Brigham Young University Law School on August 29,
2003. I am indebted to my research assistants, Justin W. Starr, Brinton Wilkins, and Spencer
McDonald for their valuable contributions.
1. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
2. See Appendix A, at the end of this article. I have not personally read all 266 articles, but I
have read a sample of them. My excellent research assistant Justin Starr has read the relevant parts of
all of them, and I have reviewed his research.
3. See infra Section III.

309

10WARDLE.MACRO

310

5/25/2004 11:35 PM

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 18

two months following its decision, which is not an insignificant number
of subsequent citations.
However, there are several curiosities about the case citations to and
legal commentaries about the Baker decision. Most of the cases do not
cite Baker for its analysis, and little attention is given to the court’s legal
rationale. There is very little use or critical discussion of the legal
analysis in either the cases or the commentary, and no court has followed
its reasoning. These clues suggest that the legal analysis in Baker may be
less than impressive. Indeed, upon close examination, the Baker majority
opinion especially is seriously deficient in credible legal analysis.
Despite numerous party and amicus briefs offered by some outstanding
legal talent, one looks in vain in the majority opinion (and one of the
concurring opinions) for sustained, credible legal analysis. Thus, Baker
truly is the curious case of the missing legal analysis.4
Part II of this paper reviews the citation to and use of Baker in the
courts. It is noted that the Baker analysis has had virtually no impact
upon legal analysis in other jurisdictions. Further, surprisingly, the legal
analysis in Baker has had only de minimis impact even in Vermont,
where so far Baker is virtually sui generis.
Next, in Part III the limited consideration of the crucial legal analysis
in Baker by legal commentators is briefly noted. Most of the supportive
legal literature has been celebratory, rather than analytical, focusing on
the policy outcome rather than the legal analysis upon which that
outcome is based.
Part IV undertakes a careful, critical analysis of the rationale of the
Vermont Supreme Court in Baker for its holding that the “Common
Benefits” Clause requires that same-sex couples be allowed to marry, or
to enter into equivalent legal unions. The majority analysis is internally
self-contradictory, inconsistent with precedent, and inconsistent with the
history and context of the origins of the “Common Benefits” Clause.
While the majority opinion contains some eloquent passages and
emotional rhetoric, that rhetoric is not matched by any consistent,
credible, disciplined legal analysis.
Part V suggests, however, that despite its analytical scantiness and
deficiencies, Baker is likely to be the direction the movement for samesex marriage takes in the near future. The endorsement of some leading
gay advocates who laud the Baker approach and who encourage the
movement for same-sex marriage to first embrace “civil unions” or
similar kinds of marriage-by-another-name as goals in the incremental
4. In this respect, Baker might be compared to other political decisions in which decorative
adjectives replaced legal analysis. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 983 (1992) (Scalia J. dissenting in part, concurring in part).
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quest for same-sex marriage is noted. The result in the recent U.S.
Supreme court decision in Lawrence v. Texas,5 steps toward the Vermont
system of legally recognized same-sex unions apart from but equivalent
to marriage, while it also embraces and imitates Baker’s substitution of
emotional rhetoric for coherent, disciplined legal analysis.
Part VI contains some suggestions about how Baker can (and should)
be distinguished and limited. Several reasons why Baker should not have
significant persuasive influence are suggested. It is noted that state
constitutional amendments may be the most prudent and effective ways
to prevent the spread of Baker-type rulings by activist state courts. In
conclusion, it is argued that the real issue raised by Baker concerns the
role of the courts in creating and defining fundamental constitutional
rights, institutions, and policy. That question goes to the very heart of the
theory (known 225 years ago as “republican” theory) upon which the
American experiment in self-government is predicated.
II. BAKER IN THE COURTS – NOTED AS A FACT OR CITED FOR
BOILERPLATE, BUT NOT FOLLOWED IN CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

The first clue that something may be amiss in the Baker analysis is in
the fact that in the first 32 months after it was decided, only ten reported
state and federal court cases cited Baker.6 While this is a respectable
body of precedent, it is far less than the astounding volume of legal
literature and disproportionately less than that explosion of celebratory
literature would lead one to expect. A very quick Shepard’s search
revealed that at least four other cases reported in the same volume of the
Atlantic, Second reporter (volume 744) have been cited much more
frequently than Baker has been cited. One case decided four weeks after
Baker, but reported in the same volume, has been cited by more than
twice as many courts as Baker has – in 20 reported cases and in at least
five other cases with Lexis citations but without a printed reporter
citation yet.7 Another case also decided four weeks after Baker and
reported in the same volume has been cited in 18 other cases, not

5. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
6. Westlaw search in “allstates, allfeds” databases for “744 A.2d 864”, last searched August
22, 2003. Baker has also been cited in two opinions of state attorneys general. See Marriages—
Marriage Licenses, 2000 Op. Ala. Att’y Gen. No. 129 (April 20, 2000) (concluding that if Vermont
passed the Civil Unions bill, neither full faith and credit nor other sources of law would require that
Vermont civil unions be recognized in Alabama), and Recognition of Vermont Same-Sex Civil
Unions By Illinois, 2000 Op. Ill. Att’y Gen. 017 (Dec. 29, 2000) (concluding that Illinois is not
required to recognize Vermont Civil Unions).
7. Commonwealth v. Basemore, 744 A.2d 717 (Pa. 2000). This Shepard’s research was last
searched August 22, 2003.
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counting multiple Lexis citations without printed reporter citations yet.8
Another case decided six weeks after Baker but reported in 744 A.2d has
been cited in 17 other cases (not counting a couple of Lexis citations
without printed reporter citations yet).9 A Delaware case decided six
months earlier, but reported in the same reported volume (744 A.2d), has
been cited by at least 18 other courts.10 Thus, even compared to these
other state court cases reported in the same volume of the Atlantic,
Second – not to mention comparison to the decisions reported in a dozen
other state and federal reporter series, the influence of Baker in other
courts seems to have been rather modest, especially in comparison to the
hype in the legal commentaries.
Moreover, a quick search shows that several other Vermont cases
decided the same year as Baker (1999) have been cited nearly as often as
Baker. For example, White v. Quechee Lakes Landowners’ Ass’n., Inc.,11
a tort case concerning indemnification, has been cited by nine other
cases, compared to ten case citations for Baker. Likewise, Stickney v.
Stickney,12 a case involving reduction of spousal compensation, is cited
in eight other cases.13 Thus, for all the celebration, Baker barely stands
out compared to several other Vermont cases decided the same year. An
even more significant clue that Baker may not be quite the
“heavyweight” legal decision that all of the celebrating would lead one to
believe comes from the fact that most of the citations to Baker are to or
for mere fact-of-existence matters, not to the court’s legal analysis. A
review of the ten court decisions that cite Baker underscores this point.
In Republican Party of Minn. v. White,14 the U.S. Supreme Court
held (by a 5-4 vote) that a Minnesota prohibition on judicial candidates
announcing their legal views is an unconstitutional violation of the
freedom of speech. The majority opinion cited Baker in passing to
illustrate the proposition that “[n]ot only do state-court judges possess
the power to ‘make’ common law, but they have the immense power to

8. Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745 (Pa. 2000). This Shepard’s research was last
searched August 22, 2003.
9. Aponte-Correa v. Allstate Ins. Co., 744 A.2d 175 (N.J. 2000). This Shepard’s research
was last searched August 22, 2003.
10. Shelton v. State, 744 A.2d 465 (Del. 1999). This information comes from a Westlaw
search on August 22, 2003.
11. 742 A.2d 734 (Vt. 1999) (decided two months before Baker). Shepard’s and Westlaw
searches last done August 22, 2003.
12. 742 A.2d 1228 (Vt. 1999) (reduction of spousal maintenance) (Westlaw search August
22, 2003).
13. See also Sagar v. Warren Selectboard, 744 A.2d 422 (Vt. 1999) (cited in at least six other
cases as of Westlaw search, August 22, 2003).
14. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
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shape the States’ constitutions as well.”15 There is no discussion (much
less endorsement) of the legal analysis in Baker.
In Levin v. Yeshiva University,16 lesbian medical students filed suit
under the State Human Rights Law and New York City Civil Rights Law
against a private university whose medical school refused to permit them
to reside in school-owned married student housing with their partners.
Overturning in part the lower court’s grant of the university’s motion to
dismiss, the New York Court of Appeals interpreted the New York City
law as
designed to secure for unmarried, committed couples the same benefits
as those enjoyed by married persons. Thus, under the legislation, samesex couples who are in committed relationships would be able to secure
housing and other benefits on the same basis as married couples . . . .
Thus, the action should not be dismissed, and defendants should be
given the opportunity to prove that the University’s policy “bears a
significant relationship to a significant business objective” or that there
is no disparate impact.17

Following this, the court cited Baker noting that the Vermont Court had
held that “same-sex couples were entitled to obtain the same benefits and
protections afforded by Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples,”
and that that decision had been effectuated by the enactment of the Civil
Unions law.18 Thus, Baker was cited for the fact of the policy adopted by
the court and implemented by the legislature. There is no analysis of the
Baker decision itself, nor is any legal analysis in Baker cited or
discussed.
In Langan Est. of Spicehandler v. St Vincent’s Hosp. of N.Y.,19 two
gay men residing in New York registered their same-sex “civil union” in
Vermont, after which one of the men was hit by an automobile in New
York and died, allegedly as a result of improper medical treatment in a
New York hospital. The surviving partner filed a wrongful death suit in
New York against the hospital.20 On the cross-motions the issue was
whether the gay couple had the status of “spouses” in Vermont, and, if
so, whether New York’s public policy barred recognition of same-sex
“spouses.”21 To answer the first question, the Supreme Court (trial judge)
in Nassau County twice cited Baker to show the judicial order and

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 784.
730 N.Y.S.2d 15 (N.Y. 2001).
Id. at 25 (citations omitted).
Id. at 25, n.4.
765 N.Y.S.2d 411 (N.Y.Sup. 2003).
Id. at 412.
Id.
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principle which the Vermont Civil Union statute was designed to
effectuate.22 So the citation clearly is to the fact and the policy (what the
Vermont Supreme Court ordered, and why) of the Baker decision.
However, it must be acknowledged that the New York court cited with
approval the following rationale for the Baker decision:
The past provides many instances where the law refused to see a human
being when it should have. See, e.g., Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 407
(concluding that African slaves and their descendants had “no rights
which the white man was bound to respect”). The future may provide
instances where the law will be asked to see a human when it should
not. See, e.g., G. Smith, Judicial Decisionmaking in the Age of
Biotechnology, 13 Notre Dame J. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 93, 114 (1999)
(noting concerns that genetically engineering humans may threaten
very nature of human individuality and identity). The challenge for
future generations will be to define what is most essentially human.
The extension of the Common Benefits Clause to acknowledge
plaintiffs as Vermonters who seek nothing more, nor less, than legal
protection and security for their avowed commitment to an intimate and
lasting human relationship is simply, when all is said and done, a
recognition of our common humanity.23

By holding that the New York public policy would not be offended by
recognizing civil union partners as “spouses” for purpose of the New
York wrongful death law, it can be inferred that the Nassau County trial
judge in Langan endorsed and embraced this policy analysis from the
Baker decision. However, he did not cite any other legal analysis, and
cites Baker only for its expression of a policy in light of which a
Vermont statute must be interpreted, with which the New York court
impliedly agreed and found not to violate New York public policy.
Moreover, the Baker quote used in Langan primarily expressed a public
policy conclusion based upon a priori value or opinion. It is only
peripherally “legal” analysis.
In Goodridge v . Dep’t. of Pub. Health,24 a Massachusetts trial court
rejected the claim of seven same-sex couples seeking marriage licenses,
22. Id. at 415, 416-17.
23. Id. at 417 (quoting Baker, 744 A.2d at 864). This “common humanity” language is the
most quoted language from Baker, fully quoted at least 26 times in the law reviews (and quoted in
one of the ten cases).
24. 14 Mass.L.Rptr. 591, 2002 WL 1299135 (Mass. Super. 2002), rev’d, Goodridge v. Dep’t
of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded
that the Commonwealth had failed to articulate a rational basis for denying civil marriage to
same-sex couples, that the Massachusetts Constitution “affirms the dignity and equality of all
individuals,” Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 948, and “forbids the creation of second-class citizens,” id.,
and that in “[l]imiting the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage to opposite-sex
couples,” id. at 968, Massachusetts marriage licensing law, “violate[d] the basic premises of
individual liberty and equality under law protected by the Massachusetts Constitution.” Id. Three
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and granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Baker is
cited three times. The first two references were citations to the many
courts that “have interpreted their marriage statutes to apply only to one
man and one woman.”25 The other reference noted that the Baker
decision was based solely on the “Common Benefits” Clause of the
Vermont Constitution, and that there was no analogous provision in the
Massachusetts Constitution.26 The Massachusetts court made no
reference to any legal analysis of the Baker decision.
In Rosengarten v. Downes,27 the Connecticut Court of Appeals
affirmed a lower court dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction of
a suit for dissolution filed by a party to a Vermont same-sex civil union.
The plaintiff argued that by allowing same-sex partners to adopt, the
Connecticut legislature had shown a willingness to recognize civil
unions, just as the Vermont Supreme Court in Baker had relied on a
similar change in Vermont adoption law to justify its decision. The
Connecticut court disagreed, noting that the legislative history clearly
showed “that a number of legislators were opposed to adoption of this
legislation if it were to be used later in any way as a wedge by appellate
or trial courts to require recognition of civil unions in Connecticut in the
manner they ascribed to the Vermont Supreme Court in Baker.”28 This
concern had ample justification, because the Baker court had arrived at
its decision by using amendments to adoption laws “as a wedge” to show
“there was no proper governmental purpose under the common benefits
clause of the Vermont constitution to restrict marriage to unions between
a man and a woman.”29 Thus, the Rosengarten case did cite one point of
legal analysis in the Baker decision, but it explicitly declines to follow
that rationale because the Connecticut legislature expressly rejected the
connection between adoption and same-sex unions that the Baker court
had inferred and relied upon.30
months later, in In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565 (Mass. 2004), the same
court rendered an “advisory opinion” to the state Senate indicating that creation of Vermont-style
Civil Unions would also violate the Massachusetts Constitution because
[t]he same defects of rationality evident in the marriage ban considered in Goodridge are
evident in, if not exaggerated by, Senate No. 2175 [the proposed Civil Union bill] . . . .
Because the proposed law by its express terms forbids same-sex couples entry into civil
marriage, it continues to relegate same-sex couples to a different status . . . . The history
of our nation has demonstrated that separate is seldom, if ever, equal.
802 N.E.2d at 569.
25. Goodridge, 14 Mass.L.Rptr. at *2, *3.
26. Id. at *6.
27. 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. 2002).
28. Id. at 181.
29. Id.
30. The Connecticut court may have signaled its own disapproval of the Baker logic on this
point when it put “reality” in quotes: “After discussing what it termed the ‘reality’ that some persons
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The lack of use of the legal analysis in Baker is even more startling
in the subsequent references to Baker in decisions of the Vermont
Supreme Court. Baker was cited only five times in reported Vermont
decisions (printed in the Atlantic, Second, reporter series) in the first 32
months after the case was decided, and for innocuous points.
In two cases Baker is cited for the principle of statutory construction
that courts must discern and follow legislative intent. In Cantin v.
Young,31 the plaintiff moved for modification of child support to include
her former husband’s workers’ compensation benefits as income in
determining the guideline amount. The court cited Baker when noting
“[o]ur intent in construing a statutory provision is to discern the intent of
the Legislature.”32 There is no other discussion or analysis of the Baker
decision itself. Similarly, in Colwell v. Allstate Ins. Co.,33 insured parties
brought declaratory judgment actions against their automobile insurers
and self-insured employer to recover underinsured motorist benefits. The
court noted,
In construing a statutory provision, our paramount goal is to discern
and implement the intent of the Legislature. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d
864, 868 (1999) . . . . When the language of a statute is plain and
unambiguous, we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning
expressed by that language. Baker, 744 A.2d at 868.34

There is no further discussion or analysis of the Baker decision itself.
These cases reveal that the one legal holding in Baker that has actually
been cited and used by other courts comes from the part of the opinion
that interpreted the Vermont marriage statute as not allowing same-sex
couples to marry.
In Daye v. State of Vermont,35 a prisoner advocacy group filed suit
challenging the validity of contracts for transfer of Vermont prisoners to
prisons in other states alleging violations of the Interstate Corrections
Compact and of the Vermont Constitution’s “visible punishments”
clause. The trial court dismissed for lack of standing.36 The Vermont
Supreme Court affirmed and also noted that even if the parties had
standing, their claims would fail.37 As to the “visible punishments”
in same-sex relationships were conceiving children by artificial means, the Vermont court so used
the enactment by the Vermont legislature of that change in the law . . . .” Id.
31. 770 A.2d 449 (Vt. 2000).
32. Id. at 451 (citing Baker, 744 A.2d at 868).
33. 819 A.2d 727 (Vt. 2003).
34. Id. at 730.
35. 769 A.2d 630 (Vt. 2000).
36. Id. at 632.
37. Id. As to the ICC claims, the court held that the Corrections Commissioner had authority
to enter into a transfer agreement with a New Jersey County (not just a state), to allow Virginia
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provision, the court reviewed the history of that provision of the state
constitution and quoted Baker for the propositions that “our state
constitution provides the ‘first and primary safeguard of the rights and
liberties of all Vermonters,’” and that “‘the motivating ideal of the
framers’ must continually inform our analysis of contemporary issues.”38
Applying that standard, the court concluded that “the fundamental
purpose—the ‘motivating ideal’—of the framers was to replace brutal
punishments with visible labor for the people to observe and ‘and be
instructed by’ is largely persuasive.39 What plaintiffs have failed to
demonstrate is any violation of that motivating ideal.”40 Baker was cited
once solely for historical fact to provide the “primary safeguard” context
for the issue before the court.41
In Brady v. Dean,42 several members of Vermont House of
Representatives, three town clerks, and some taxpayers filed suit against
the governor of Vermont and other state officials to enjoin
implementation of same-sex civil union law. The court referred to Baker
when explaining the origins of the civil union law.43 There was no
discussion or analysis of the Baker decision itself. However, the Brady
case is worth mentioning further because it seems to support the idea that
Baker is sui generis.
In Brady the plaintiffs challenged the enactment of the Vermont
Civil Union law because of, inter alia, alleged serious misconduct by
fourteen legislators that voted for the civil union law. Their allegations,
which were accepted at face value for purposes of the motion, were
that fourteen members of the [Vermont] House of Representatives
participated in a “dollar-a-question” betting pool in connection with a
preliminary vote on the civil unions bill. The money went to the
participant coming closest to predicting the number of “yes” votes. The
vote was seventy-six to sixty-nine in favor of having the bill read a
third time. All fourteen participants in the pool voted “yes.”44

The Speaker of the House expressed disapproval but did not disqualify
the fourteen nor did any of them disqualify themselves, nor was the

prison officials to select the prison where the Vermont prisoners would be kept, and to apply stricter
visitation rules than apply in Vermont prisons. Id. at 633-36.
38. Id. at 638 (quoting Baker, 744 A.2d at 870).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 790 A.2d 428 (Vt. 2001). See generally Lynn D. Wardle, Counting the Costs of Civil
Unions: Some Potential Detrimental Effects on Family Law, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 401, 426-428
(2002).
43. Id. at 429.
44. Id.
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legislative vote retaken or reconsidered.45 Plaintiffs alleged violation of
state constitutional prohibition on accepting “any fee or reward” for
advocating a bill, from “tak[ing] greater fees than the law allows,” the
“Common Benefits” Clause (basis for the Baker ruling), and statutes
criminalizing the “running of lotteries, games of chance and
bookmaking.”46 The trial court ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing,
the issue was a political issue, and separation of powers would prevent
the court from adjudicating those claims.47
The Vermont Supreme Court, which in Baker had effectively
ordered the state legislature to legalize same-sex marriage or create an
equivalent legal union for same-sex couples, affirmed on the ground that
plaintiffs lacked standing because of the principle of judicial
noninterference with legislative functions and political questions.48 The
court said: “The prudent exercise of judicial self-restraint and deference
to the independence of a coordinate governmental branch”49 prevented
the court from investigating charges that the democratic process was
compromised by the unethical conduct, and that “a proper regard for the
independence of the Legislature”50 required the court to ignore the
charges because “no branch [may] usurp the ‘core functions’ . . . or
impair the ‘independent institutional integrity’ of another.”51
Brady revealed behavior that not only indicts the leaders of the
Vermont legislature who simply looked the other way and failed to take
any action to rectify the abuse of legislative process, but it revealed the
double-standard of the Vermont Supreme Court which brushed aside the
challenges to the alleged legislative corruption. One wonders why the
court’s commitment to “the constitutional imperative to afford all
Vermonters the common benefit, protection, and security of the law,”52
did not extend to protecting the rights of opponents of the court’s own
favored policy, or to enforcing the anti-gambling and legislative integrity
laws against legislators who support that judicially-preferred policy. In
Baker, the Vermont Supreme Court ended its landmark decision
45. Id. at 430 (“[Speaker] Metzger stated that he was ‘appalled’ and ‘ashamed’ by the
conduct of the participants and ‘concerned [about] the impact on the final vote’ but otherwise no
objection . . .”).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 429.
48. The town clerks asserted that it violated their religious liberty to be required to register
same-sex civil unions. The trial court rejected this claim on the merits, and the supreme court agreed
that as the civil union law allowed assistants to issue the civil union license, the religious liberty of
the town clerks was adequately accommodated. Id. at 434-35.
49. Id. at 431.
50. Id. at 432.
51. Id.
52. Baker, 744 A.2d at 867.
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mandating equal legal status and benefits for same-sex couples with the
ringing declaration: “The extension of the Common Benefits Clause to
acknowledge plaintiffs as Vermonters who seek nothing more, nor less,
than legal protection and security for their avowed commitment to an
intimate and lasting human relationship is simply, when all is said and
done, a recognition of our common humanity.”53 Yet Brady could be
read as demonstrating that legislators who cooperate to implement
controversial judicial preferences in Vermont are not held to the common
standards applicable to mere “common humanity.”54 At the very least,
Brady suggests that the Baker decision really is sui generis.
The fifth reported Vermont case to cite Baker involved the
“Common Benefits” Clause, the basis for the Baker ruling, and brings us
to consider the impact of Baker in Vermont upon interpretation of that
clause of the Vermont Constitution. The Clause provides: “That
government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit,
protection, and security of the people, nation, or community, and not for
the particular emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or
set of persons, who are a part only of that community . . . .”55 In the first
32 months since Baker was decided, the Vermont Supreme Court
interpreted the “Common Benefits” clause in only one case.56 It cited
Baker in that case, but, in stark contrast to Baker, it declined to interfere
with or overrule the legislative policy, expressing strong deference to the
legislature (ironically quoting Baker for that principle). In OMYA, Inc. v.
Town of Middlebury,57 the owner of a quarry appealed the decision of the
Vermont Environmental Board rejecting its request to double the number
53. Id at 889.
54. Id.
55. VT. CONST., ch. I, art. 7. While the provision refers to “the common benefit . . . of the
people” (singular) the Vermont Supreme Court calls this the “Common Benefits Clause” (plural),
and so that grammatically questionable form is used herein.
56. In another case, the Vermont Supreme Court declined to reach the “Common Benefits”
Clause issue because the appellant had not raised the issue in the trial court. In re Picket Fence
Preview, 795 A.2d 1242 (Vt. 2002) (affirming Vermont Tax Commissioner and Superior Court
determination that a for-sale-by-owner guide was not exempt from the state use tax as a
“newspaper,” and rejecting the taxpayer’s federal equal protection and free speech claims, and
declining to reach the “Common Benefits” Clause and other Vermont Constitution claims). In a
second case, Town of Killington v. State, 776 A.2d 395, 397 (Vt. 2001), the “Common Benefits”
Clause is mentioned in passing in an explanation of the factual background of a dispute over
interpretation of a tax statute which had been enacted in response to a decision by the Vermont
Supreme Court interpreting the “Common Benefits” Clause as requiring equalization of education
spending among different Vermont towns. The mention of the “Common Benefits” Clause was
purely for historical case context and did not bear upon the issue, and interpretation of statute, which
turned on effectuating the intent of the legislature, the court rejecting the Town’s interpretation and
accepting the state’s. Id. at 400-01. Likewise, in Brady, 790 A.2d 428, the Vermont Supreme Court
declined to reach the merits of a “Common Benefits” Clause claim challenging legislative betting on
the outcome of the Civil Union bill.
57. 758 A.2d 777 (Vt. 2000).
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of round trips the quarry’s trucks could make through a small village
located between the quarry and the quarry’s processing plant.58 After
brushing aside other constitutional claims,59 the Vermont Supreme Court
considered the quarry operator’s argument that the Board’s decision
violated the “Common Benefits” Clause of the Vermont Constitution
because other quarry operators were not similarly restricted under the
state’s land use law.60 The court cited three cases, including Baker, to
support the proposition that “the legislature may choose to address
problems incrementally.”61 The court quoted dicta from Baker to make
the point that: “It is . . . well settled that statutes are not necessarily
unconstitutional because they fail to extend legal protection to all who
are similarly situated.”62 The court reasoned that because the land use
law requiring permits “does not apply to all in-state developments or
out-of-state enterprises does not render it constitutionally infirm.”63 The
quarry cited cases where increased automobile traffic had been approved
by the Board, but the court distinguished the environmental impact of
increased car traffic from increased truck traffic. Since the quarry had not
shown that the Board acted arbitrarily or fancifully, the court upheld the
Board decision.64 Thus, the OMYA court cited Baker for a principle that
had been noted in dicta (but not followed) in Baker, a principle used to
uphold legislation. OMYA did not cite Baker for the holding of Baker, or
for the interpretation of the “Common Benefits” Clause that overcame or
circumvented the deference to legislation principle, or for the rationale or
logic behind that interpretation in Baker. Interestingly, the court in
OMYA did not even try to distinguish the interpretation of the “Common
Benefits” Clause in Baker. That is significant, for if the Baker standard
of interpretation of the “Common Benefits” Clause had been applied in
OMYA, it seems that it would have led the court to overturn the decision
of the Environmental Board. There certainly is a discrepancy between
the outcome in Baker and in OMYA insofar as upholding legislation that
has disparate impact upon separate groups, differentially affecting the
rights enjoyed by one class of persons. So the failure to fully distinguish

58. The quarry had permission to make 85 round trips through Brandon per day; it sought
permission to make 170 round trips; the Environmental Board granted permission to make 115
roundtrips per day. Id. at 779.
59. The Vermont Supreme Court first rejected OMYA’s claim that the decision exceeded the
jurisdiction and authority of the Board, id. at 779-80; violated substantive due process, id. at 780;
and constituted an impermissible moratorium. Id.
60. Id. at 780.
61. Id. at 781. The holding in Baker would seem to contradict this principle.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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or reconcile the cases is noteworthy. It suggests that the Vermont
Supreme Court considers Baker to have established a rule or principle
that is not of general applicability. It is sui generis. And as such, it is
self-contradictory. As it seems to have been applied by the Vermont
Supreme Court, the Baker interpretation of the Vermont “Common
Benefits” Clause (creating a special exception to the “Common Benefits”
Clause interpretation for same-sex couples only) seems to violate the
Baker commonality principle.
By comparison, in the three years before Baker was decided, the
Vermont Supreme Court interpreted the “Common Benefits” Clause in
four cases.65 In three of the four cases, the “Common Benefits” Clause
claim was rejected. In L’Esperance v. Town of Charlotte,66 Justice
Dooley, writing for the court, held that a trial court ruling requiring the
selectmen of a town to renew a lease for lakefront property for the rent
set in the original lease did not violate the “Common Benefits” Clause
because it provided the town with “adequate and reasonable benefits.”67
Parker v. Gorczyk,68 held that a policy that would make prisoners
convicted of violent felonies ineligible for furlough until the expiration
of their minimum sentences does not violate state due process of equal
protection (“Common Benefits” Clause) with only passing reference to
the Clause, but incorporating much due process analysis. In Wood v.
Fletcher Allen Health Care,69 the court, per Justice Dooley, rejected a
“Common Benefits” Clause claim by the employer of a pregnant woman
allowed disability benefits. “The ‘inquiry under Article 7 is whether the
statute is reasonably related to the promotion of a valid public
purpose.’”70
In one case, however, the “Common Benefits” Clause claim was
accepted and resulted in a significant change in state education funding
policy. In Brigham v. State,71 decided more than two years before Baker,
65. The court has noted, but avoided interpreting, the “Common Benefits” Clause in several
other cases. See In re A.J., 733 A.2d 36 (Vt. 1999) (subordinating “Common Benefits” Clause
claims to federal Equal Protection claims—which were rejected—where a mother was challenging
the federal Indian Child Welfare Act exclusion of unrecognized tribes); Mello v. Cohen, 724 A.2d
471, 473 (Vt. 1998) (noting but not evaluating plaintiff’s claim that an expert testimony requirement
violated several provisions including the “Common Benefits” Clause); Tarrant v. Dep’t of Taxes,
733 A.2d 733, 747 (Vt. 1999) (holding that taxpayer is entitled to tax credit for pro rata share of
taxes paid by their Subchapter S corporation on statutory grounds, dissenting opinion disagrees and
summarily concludes that claim that tax rule violates, inter alia, the “Common Benefits” Clause is
without merit).
66. 704 A.2d 760 (Vt. 1997).
67. Id. at 763.
68. 744 A.2d 410 (Vt. 1999).
69. 739 A.2d 1201 (Vt. 1999).
70. Id. at 1207 (quoting MacCallum v. Seymour’s Adm’r, 686 A.2d 935, 937 (Vt. 1996)).
71. 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997). See infra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
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the court held that the state scheme for funding public education which
resulted in huge disparities in per-pupil educational spending (ranging
from $2979 to $7726) fell “well short of achieving reasonable
educational equality of opportunity,” and violated the “Common
Benefits” Clause and the “Education and Virtue” Clause of the Vermont
Constitution.72
Given the small number of “Common Benefits” Clause cases and the
relatively short period of time, it is not possible to make a definitive
statement about the impact of Baker on Vermont “Common Benefits”
Clause jurisprudence. But this much can be said: the unique construction
of the “Common Benefits” Clause in Baker and the court’s creative
rationale for that interpretation have not been used, much less followed,
in any reported cases decided in Vermont in the 32 months since Baker
was decided. Only one case cites Baker for any constitutional analysis,
and that is for a proposition relating to a generic principle concerning the
importance of finding and following the original intent and purpose of
the founders. The radical construction of the “Common Benefits” Clause
in Baker appears to be sui generis in Vermont so far.
Thus, courts in other jurisdictions have cited Baker for the fact of its
existence and the fact of its judgment. While a few hint approval, there
has been only one clear endorsement of the judgment. Most significantly,
courts in other jurisdictions have not cited, followed, or used the legal
rationale at the core of Baker—the interpretation of equality principles—
at all. The Baker interpretation has been noted as a matter of fact, but has
not been followed in equality cases in other jurisdictions, and the logic
and rationale of Baker have not been imitated or followed at all in
interpreting equality principles. Even in Vermont, Baker has been cited
only for routine statutory interpretation principles and for the principle
that finding the original intent and purpose of the founders is important
in interpreting the state constitution. As to the scope and meaning and
application of the “Common Benefits” Clause, nearly three years after its
sensational decision, Baker remains sui generis even in the Vermont
Supreme Court.
Thus, of the ten cases that cited Baker, three cite Baker for the
principles of statutory interpretation it stated. Three cite Baker solely or
primarily for the fact of the policy that was adopted, not to follow or
endorse it but to note that it was adopted. As for the other cases, one
distinguishes the “Common Benefits” Clause basis of Baker, one
distinguishes Baker’s interpretation of the implication of the Vermont
adoption statute to permit same-sex couples to adopt, one cites Baker to

72. Id. at 397.
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explain the factual context in which the other case arose, one cites Baker
for the general policy of giving liberal interpretation to the Vermont
Constitution, and one cites Baker for the proposition of the importance of
deferring to the legislature.
III. THE SILENCE IN THE CELEBRATION—WHAT THE LEGAL
LITERATURE DOES NOT SAY ABOUT BAKER
The articles reviewed by my research assistant, Justin Starr, in
Appendix A, total 266 pieces, and they are categorized into five
categories. One hundred thirty-nine (139) articles are positive—
supportive of Baker. Another twenty-eight (28) articles support Baker as
a step in the right direction but are critical of the court for not going far
enough, for allowing the creation of a separate-but-equal regime and not
ordering the outright legalization of same-sex marriage. That makes a
total of 167 articles that are positive about Baker. Seventy-one (71) other
articles took a neutral position, describing and reporting but neither
endorsing nor criticizing the decision. Twenty-seven (27) articles were
negative—critical of some aspect of the Baker decision; the most
common criticism was for disregarding, supplanting or usurping, the role
of the legislature, that is, for judicial legislation. Finally, one article
challenged the notion that Baker was positive, but could not be called
neutral or negative because the article author argued that marriage is an
inherently dysfunctional institution, and called for abolition of marriage
altogether.
While most law review writing about recent cases focuses on
understanding, explaining and either criticizing or supporting the legal
analysis of the court, a different pattern characterizes most of the law
review writing about Baker. Virtually all of the legal writing about Baker
focuses on the result, and largely ignores the legal analysis. The legal
literature supportive of Baker tends to be celebratory rather than
analytical. At first blush, one might brush aside that phenomenon. After
all, before Baker not a single American state accorded same-sex couples
any status or legal relationship rights significantly comparable to
marriage,73 but Baker declared that same-sex couples had a constitutional
73. Two years before the Baker decision, the Hawaii legislature enacted a law allowing any
two persons unable to marry to register as “reciprocal beneficiaries.” HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §
431:10-234 (Michie 2001). However, that law emphasizes that the relationship is not equal to or
comparable to marriage, nor was it designed for or limited to same-sex couples. See Craig W.
Christensen, If Not Marriage? On Securing Gay and Lesbian Family Values by a ‘Simulacrum of
Marriage’, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1699, 1739-40 (1998) (“Underscoring that the status is not meant
to confer special symbolic recognition on gay relationships, the law specifies that it is as open to ‘a
widowed mother and her unmarried son’ as to ‘two individuals who are of the same gender.’”).
Compared to civil unions, relatively few benefits are conferred upon Hawaii reciprocal beneficiaries,
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right under the Vermont Constitution to the same or equivalent legal
status and benefits as married couples. So, some celebration is to be
expected. However, it is not the presence of celebratory writing about
Baker that is curious; it is the absence of analytical writing. Indeed, given
the precedential potential of the ground-breaking decision, one would
expect enthusiasts of same-sex unions to have produced a geyser of legal
analysis devotedly dissecting the court’s rationale in delicious detail,
enthusiastically elucidating the logic of the court’s interpretation of the
Vermont Constitution, and elaborately explaining why the analysis of the
Court in Baker is irrefutable. In context, the paucity of reference to the
Vermont Supreme Court’s legal analysis in the voluminous writing
endorsing Baker seems curious.
Most of the supportive law review articles on Baker do not attempt
to defend the decision—they fete, celebrate, and lionize Baker but they
do not examine or analyze. Greg Johnson sets the tone in his article, In
Praise of Civil Unions: “Let us celebrate Vermont! Let us praise civil
unions!”74 Several candidly (or tacitly) admit that Baker does not contain
significant legal analysis. Michael Mello, for example, states that the
Baker opinion “did not contain civil rights doctrine.”75 Rather, they
frequently direct the focus of consideration of Baker to the importance of
larger, non-technical, non-analytical factors. Beth Robinson, one of the
plaintiff’s attorneys in Baker, wrote: “I think some of the most valuable
lessons we, as lawyers, can draw from the Vermont experience aren’t
strictly legal, or academic, and can’t be gleaned by simply reading the
Baker v. State decision or reviewing the civil union law.”76 The negative
pregnant in that statement is significant. Some articles praise the Baker
court for its political wisdom—advancing the cause of same-sex
marriage agenda without going so far as to cause an overwhelming
backlash. For example, William Eskridge makes this point, describing
what he calls the “nightmare scenario.”
Legislative adoption of same-sex marriage might have polarized the
electorate and yielded a traditionalist backlash even more than civil
unions have done. In that event, not only would the next legislature and

and very few same-sex (or other) couples have registered as reciprocal beneficiaries. Greg Johnson,
In Praise of Civil Unions, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 315, 334 n.142 (2002) (only 592 couples registered as
Hawaii reciprocal beneficiaries in the first four years, compared to 2,479 couples who registered for
Vermont civil unions in the first year, and Professor Johnson calls the Hawaii reciprocal beneficiary
law “a stigmatizing law.”)
74. Johnson, supra note 73.
75. Michael Mello, For Today, I’m Gay: The Unfinished Battle for Same-sex Marriage in
Vermont, 25 VT. L. REV. 149, 172 (2000).
76. Beth Robinson, The Road to Inclusion for Same-Sex Couples: Lessons from Vermont, 11
SETON HALL CONST. L. J. 237, 237 (2001).
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governor have been able to repeal the civil unions law, but they might
have had enough votes to propose a constitutional amendment
overriding Baker. In this nightmare scenario, pushing for option A, the
best choice, would not only have resulted in option C, the worst choice,
but would have run the risk of hard-wiring option C into Vermont
constitutional law.
The nightmare scenario is also the reason the Vermont Supreme Court
pulled its punches in Baker. The justices on that court were aware of
the fate of earlier same-sex marriage rulings in other states.77

About ten percent (10%) of the articles listed in Appendix A criticize
Baker and portray it as a negative decision. Most of the criticisms of
Baker in the law review literature focus on the judicial activism of the
court. They assert that the court usurped a function that is not judicial,
but either legislative or constitutive (to create or amend the
constitution).78
IV. A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE LEGAL ANALYSIS IN BAKER
The history of how commentators who support Baker for policy
reasons have been silent about the legal reasoning, and of how other
courts and even the Vermont Supreme Court in other cases have largely
ignored the crucial legal reasoning in Baker invites a critical analysis of
the Baker opinion.
The Vermont Supreme Court issued three opinions in Baker totaling
46 pages in volume 744 of the Atlantic, Second reporter.79 The majority
opinion by Chief Justice Jeffrey L. Amestoy represented the views of
three justices completely, and of two other justices partially. Justice John
A. Dooley’s concurring opinion rejected the court’s constitutional
analysis, but reached the same conclusion by another approach. Justice
Denise R. Johnson’s separate opinion concurred in the court’s
constitutional analysis, suggesting an additional rationale, and dissented

77. William N. Eskridge, Equality Practice: Liberal Reflections on the Jurisprudence of Civil
Unions, 64 ALB. L. REV. 853, 873-74 (2001). See also, Gil Kujovich, An Essay on the Passive Virtue
of Baker v. State, 25 VT. L. REV. 93, 101 (2000)(“This recent history did not go unnoticed by the
Baker court. Chief Justice Amestoy’s opinion for the majority expressly acknowledged the ‘political
cauldron of public debate’ that had produced state constitutional amendment’s in Alaska and
Hawaii . . . .”).
78. See, e.g., Lino Graglia, Single-Sex “Marriage”: The Role of the Courts, 2001 BYU L.
REV. 1013, 1014 (2001); Francis Cardinal George, O.M.I., Law and Culture, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV.
1, 16 (2003); Robert H. Bork, The Judge’s Role in Law and Culture, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 19, 26
(2003).
79. The caption is at 744 A.2d 864, but the majority opinion begins on page 867 and ends on
page 889; Justice Dooley’s opinion runs from 889-897; and Justice Johnson’s opinion runs from
897-912.
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from the remedy part of the majority opinion. Only one of the opinions,
Justice Dooley’s, contains sustained, credible, legal analysis.
The majority opinion contains four main parts, (a) analyzing the
statutory question, (b) determining the constitutional standard, (c)
applying the constitutional standard, and (d) deciding the appropriate
remedy. Three of them are seriously defective in legal analysis.
A. Statutory Interpretation
The only part of the majority opinion that was supported
unanimously by all five justices (apart from the mandate reversing the
lower court) was the statutory analysis. Like every other court in the
country that has faced similar statutory claims,80 the Vermont Supreme
Court rejected the assertion that the state marriage statute could be
construed to require marriage license officials to allow same-sex couples
to marry.81 The court noted that the objective in deciding contested
statutory construction is “to discern the legislative intent,” and to do that
the court relied “on the plain and ordinary meaning of the words . . . .”82
Referring to dictionaries,83 “the understanding of the term [that] is wellrooted in Vermont common law,”84 and the meaning indicated by
numerous related statutes,85 the court held that “the evidence
demonstrates a clear legislative assumption that marriage under our
statutory scheme consists of a union between a man and a woman.”86
That clear and particular legislative intent also distinguished a case cited
by plaintiffs in which the court had interpreted the term “spouse” in an
adoption statute to include same-sex partners.87
The
five-paragraph
statutory
interpretation
is
simple,
straightforward, and unremarkable. It exemplifies ordinary, credible,
legal analysis, correctly states established legal principles, cites

80. See, e.g., Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); Weaver v. G.D. Searle &
Co., 558 F. Supp. 720 (N.D. Ala. 1983); Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743 (Al.
Super. Ct. 1998); Dean v. Dist. of Colum., 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44
(Haw. 1993); In re Estate of Hall, 707 N.E.2d 201 (Ill. Ct. App. 1998); Jennings v. Jennings, 315
A.2d 816 (Md. Ct. App. 1974). See also, Robin Cheryl Miller & Jason Binimow, Marriage Between
Persons of Same-Sex: United States and Canadian Cases, 2003 A.L.R. FED. 2 (2003) (listing cases
interpreting state statutes to prevent same-sex marriages in Section 3).
81. Baker, 744 A.2d at 869.
82. Id. at 868.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 868-69.
86. Id. at 869.
87. In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993), distinguished in Baker at 744 A.2d at 869
because the B.L.V.B. case involved “a narrow statutory exception” which had to be interpreted
broadly to effectuate what the court decided was the legislature’s real “intent and spirit.” Id.
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precedents that actually support those principles, and applies those
principles in a direct, coherent fashion. This analytical approach stands in
stark contrast to the kind and quality of analysis in the remaining sections
of the majority opinion (and most of Justice Johnson’s opinion). As
noted above, the court’s summary statements of basic principles of
statutory construction are the legal principles for which Baker is most
frequently cited.88
B. Standard of Review Under the “Common Benefits” Clause
The court’s analysis of the constitutional issues, by contrast, fills
seventeen (17) pages. The ultimate constitutional issue is whether
excluding same-sex couples from marriage and its many benefits violates
Vermont’s “counterpart” to the federal Equal Protection Clause, the
“Common Benefits” Clause. The court asserted that the “Common
Benefits” Clause predates, is independent from, and reflects somewhat
different values than (is “not a mere reflection of”) the federal
Constitution’s equality rule.89 From the outset, the court also focuses on
the state’s claim that marriage links procreation and childrearing, and the
plaintiffs’ challenge to it.90
In the section on “Historical Development,”91 the court thoroughly
reviewed the standards and tests under the “Common Benefits” Clause,
and how they differ from federal Equal Protection standards and
analysis, noting that Vermont cases apply a “more stringent”
reasonableness inquiry than federal “rational basis” cases92 and “have
been less than consistent in their application” of the “Common Benefits”
Clause jurisprudence.93 The court concluded that “[t]he rigid categories
utilized . . . under the Fourteenth Amendment [Equal Protection analysis]
find no support in our early case law and, while routinely cited, are often
effectively ignored in our more recent cases.”94 Denial of public benefits

88. See infra Section II.
89. Baker, 744 A.2d at 870.
90. Id. (noting plaintiff’s claim that:
the large number of married couples without children, and the increasing incidence of
same-sex couples with children, undermines the State’s rationale [that marriage links
procreation and child rearing]. They note that Vermont law affirmatively guarantees the
right to adopt and raise children regardless of the sex of the parents . . . and challenge the
logic of the legislative scheme that recognizes the rights of same-sex partners as parents,
yet denies them—and their children—the same security as spouses.)
91. Id. at 870-73.
92. Id. at 872.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 873.
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to some persons must be justified under the “Common Benefits” Clause
by “an appropriate and overriding public interest.”95
The review of the Vermont “Common Benefits” Clause
jurisprudence is informative and directive. Many cases are cited and
discussed. However, by contrast, the asserted reasons for rejecting a
structured, standard, multi-tiered approach are weak and unpersuasive.96
More importantly, the articulated basis for adopting the new “balancing”
approach for “Common Benefits” Clause analysis is utterly without
support. The court cites one case, State v. Ludlow Supermarkets, Inc.,97
which it reads as departing from the traditional, structured “Common
Benefits” Clause analysis, and adopting a pure “balancing” approach.98
But closer examination of both Ludlow and of the cases decided during
more than seventeen years between Ludlow and Baker contradicts the
Baker court’s reading of Ludlow. First, nothing in Ludlow supports the
claim that the Vermont Supreme Court in that case changed the standard
of “Common Benefits” Clause analysis. In Ludlow, the court invalidated
a Sunday closing law that applied only to large retailers, but not to small
retailers, finding the law to give an improper preference to small
businesses unrelated to any non-preferential, legitimate legislative
purpose.99 The Ludlow court quoted, but did not rest upon, a case in
which the New Jersey Supreme Court had invalidated a Sunday closing
law applicable to some specific goods, but not applicable to many others
because, regardless of “rational basis” it violated “common sense”100 (a
rudder-less standard somewhat akin to that used in Baker). The Ludlow
court found “the core purpose” of the selective Sunday closing law
“confirmed by legislative language is the special protection of the
economic health of small, locally owned, retail stores” which could “be
achieved without this particular” discrimination between large and small
businesses.101 While distinguishing the federalism constraints upon
95. Id.
96. For example, the court’s reliance on the fact that the use of different categories linked to
different (sliding scale) standards of Equal Protection (or “Common Benefits” Clause) analysis
“find[s] no support in our early case law” to justify rejection of such categories and different
standards of review is unpersuasive. Id. The use of different categories and standards is a relatively
new development in the history of federal Equal Protection jurisprudence as well as in Vermont
“Common Benefits” Clause jurisprudence; that structured (multi-tiered) approach blossomed in
federal jurisprudence primarily in the last half of the twentieth century. See, LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 999-1001 (1978). So the absence of such analysis in the “early
case law” of Vermont is hardly surprising.
97. 448 A.2d 791 (1982).
98. Baker, 744 A.2d at 871-73.
99. Ludlow, 448 A.2d at 794-96. (“The purpose of the preferential legislation must be to
further a goal independent of the preference awarded . . . .”). Id. at 795.
100. Vornado, Inc. v. Hyland, 390 A.2d 606, 615-16 (N.J. 1978).
101. Ludlow, 448 A.2d at 796.
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federal Equal Protection analysis from the local expertise of state
courts,102 Ludlow did not purport to modify the standard of analysis
under the “Common Benefits” Clause, but simply summarized and
restated it. The only reference to balance was when the court noted:
Almost all regulatory legislation, particularly when the concern is
economic, tends to be uneven in its impact. Such inequalities are not
fatal with respect to constitutional standards if the underlying policy
supporting the regulation is a compelling one, and the unbalanced
impact is, as a practical matter, a necessary consequence of the most
reasonable way of implementing that policy.103

This sole reference to “balance” is made in connection with the wellknown standard of “compelling interest” and classification “necessary”
to implement that interest, a standard that has been around in Vermont
since at least 1939 when the Vermont Supreme Court admitted that under
the “Common Benefits” Clause “it has been repeatedly recognized that in
the exercise of the police power of the State, a legislative classification
that is not arbitrary or irrational may be established.”104 The “unbalanced
impact” refers to the disparate impact on different groups, not the court’s
analytical test. Ludlow simply does not adopt or support the malleable
“balancing” standard of “Common Benefits” Clause analysis utilized by
the court in Baker to hold that the Vermont marriage law allowing only
male-female couples to marry was unconstitutional.
Moreover, contrary to the Baker majority’s indication,105 none of the
twenty cases that cited Ludlow during the intervening twenty-plus years,
except Baker, read Ludlow as signaling a change in the standard of
“Common Benefits” Clause analysis, or for adoption of a “balancing”
test.106 Rather, the subsequent decisions cited Ludlow often for the
102. Id. at 795.
103. Id. at 793 (citing State v. Auclair, 4 A.2d 107, 113 (1939).
104. Auclair, 4 A.2d at 113.
105. Baker, 744 A.2d at 873. (“The balancing approach utilized in Ludlow and implicit in our
recent decisions . . . .”). (emphasis added).
106. J.L. v. Miller, 817 A.2d 1, 5 (Vt. 2002) (Ludlow shows that “[c]ourts have a duty to
refrain from interfering with the sovereign powers of the legislature as allocated by the state
constitution.”); In re Reapportionment, 624 A.2d 323, 337 (Vt. 1993) (Ludlow held that preferential
legislation must further a goal independent of the preference awarded); Hodgeman v. Jard Co., 599
A.2d 1371, 1373 (Vt. 1991) (Ludlow established that “the Vermont Constitution is freestanding and
may require this Court to examine more closely distinctions drawn by state government than would
the Fourteenth Amendment.”); Town of Sandgate v. Colehamer, 589 A.2d 1205, 1211 (Vt. 1990)
(Ludlow shows that legislation that prefers one group above another may be unconstitutional);
Choquette v. Perrault, 569 A.2d 455, 459 (Vt. 1989) (summarizing holding of Ludlow as selective
Sunday closing law “did not serve ‘an appropriate and overriding public interest,’ nor did the State
establish that the infringement of the rights of the citizens was merely incidental and that the
objectives of the law could be reached in no other way”) and id. at 460 (Ludlow stated that “virtually
all regulatory statutes have disparate effects on various sectors of the public”); State v. Saari, 568
A.2d 344, 348 (Vt. 1989) (Ludlow indicated that regulatory legislation is not unconstitutional where
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proposition that the purpose of the “Common Benefits” Clause is to
avoid preference for one group,107 for the proposition that provisions of
the Vermont Constitution (including the “Common Benefits” Clause)
may be interpreted differently than counterpart provisions of the U.S.
Constitution,108 that economic regulation usually has some disparate
“unbalanced impact is . . . a necessary consequence of the most reasonable way of implementing that
policy”); In re Property of One Church Street City of Burlington, 565 A.2d 1349, 1350-51 (Vt.
1989) (agreeing that the purpose of Equal Protection Clause is to protect individual, but the purpose
of the “Common Benefits” Clause is to protect the polity from granting special privileges to the few;
under Ludlow “[t]he purpose of the preferential legislation must be to further a goal independent of
the preference awarded, sufficient to withstand constitutional scrutiny;” almost any legislation has
disparate impact; such is sustainable “if the underlying policy supporting the regulation is a
compelling one, and the unbalanced impact is, as a practical matter, a necessary consequence of the
most reasonable way of implementing that policy.”); Bryant v. Town of Essex, 564 A.2d 1052, 1057
(Vt. 1989) (under Ludlow the “Common Benefits” Clause requires party challenging law to show
“that the classifications failed to rest on a rational basis serving a legitimate public policy
objective”); Wolfe v. Yudichak, 571 A.2d 592, 602 (Vt. 1989) (Ludlow says almost all economic
legislation tends to have disparate impact); Smith v. Town of St. Johnsbury, 554 A.2d 233, 239 (Vt.
1988) (rejecting plaintiffs’ challenge to different voting rules for rural and urban areas based on
Ludlow because in this area the “Common Benefits” Clause provides no greater protection than the
federal Equal Protection Clause); In re Hill, 545 A.2d 1019, 1024 (Vt. 1988) (Ludlow cited for
principles of separation of powers and judicial self-restraint); State v. Brunelle, 534 A.2d 198, 20102 (Vt. 1987) (Ludlow set up stricter standard of review under “Common Benefits” Clause than
applies under federal Equal Protection analysis); Langle v. Kurkul, 510 A.2d 1301, 1310 (Vt. 1986)
(Ludlow held that “[s]tate courts . . . have a duty of judicial restraint which encompasses . . .
deference to legislative exercise of the sovereign power allocated to that body by the state
constitution,” but dissenting judge says it is judicial responsibility “to balance competing interests
and allocate losses,” so a new cause of action should be recognized in tort, id. at 1313); Choquette,
475 A.2d at 1081 (Ludlow cited for principle that a statute is presumptively constitutional if “[o]n its
face, the statute is not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, nor is it devoid of a public purpose.”);
State v. Badger, 450 A.2d 336, 347 (Vt. 1982) (in criminal case involving questions of search,
seizure, and confession Ludlow is cited for the principle that “the meaning of the Vermont
Constitution is [not] identical to the federal document,” and sometimes has been construed “as
protecting rights which were explicitly excluded from federal protection.”); In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d
937, 939 (Vt. 1982) (Ludlow cited for proposition that Vermont Constitution may be interpreted
differently than U.S. Constitution); see further State v. Ames Big N Department Store, 449 A.2d 984
(Vt. 1982) (Ludlow controls this case decided the same day); State v. Grand Union Co., 449 A.2d
984 (Vt. 1982) (Ludlow controls this case decided the same day).
107. See, e.g., In re Reapportionment, 624 A.2d at 337 (Ludlow held that preferential
legislation must further a goal independent of the preference awarded); Town of Sandgate v.
Colehamer, 589 A.2d 1205, 1211 (Vt. 1990) (Ludlow shows that legislation that prefers one group
above another may be unconstitutional); In re Property of One Church Street City of Burlington, 565
A.2d 1349, 1350-51 (Vt. 1989) (agreeing that the purpose of Equal Protection Clause is to protect
individual, but the purpose of the “Common Benefits” Clause is to protect the polity from granting
special privileges to the few; under Ludlow “[t]he purpose of the preferential legislation must be to
further a goal independent of the preference awarded, sufficient to withstand constitutional
scrutiny;” almost any legislation has disparate impact; such is sustainable “if the underlying policy
supporting the regulation is a compelling one, and the unbalanced impact is, as a practical matter, a
necessary consequence of the most reasonable way of implementing that policy.”).
108. See, e.g., Hodgeman v. Jard Co., 599 A.2d 1371, 1373 (Vt. 1991) (Ludlow established
that “the Vermont Constitution is freestanding and may require this Court to examine more closely
distinctions drawn by state government than would the Fourteenth Amendment.”); State v. Brunelle,
534 A.2d 198, 201-02 (Vt. 1987) (Ludlow set up stricter standard of review under “Common
Benefits” Clause than applies under federal Equal Protection analysis); State v. Badger, 450 A.2d
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impact,109 and for the principle of deference to the legislature,110 but
never for the “balancing approach” which the Baker majority discovers
in the same cases. The Baker court simply misstated or misread the
precedents. There is no support whatever in the “Common Benefits”
Clause cases citing Ludlow for the Baker majority’s reading of Ludlow or
its interpretation of the standard or analysis under the “Common
Benefits” Clause.
Just two years before Baker, in Brigham v. State, arguably the most
significant “Common Benefits” Clause decision in the decade before
Baker, the court overturned the state scheme for funding public
education which resulted in wide differences in per-pupil educational
spending.111 The court unequivocally stated: “We have held that the
Common Benefits Clause in the Vermont Constitution, see ch. I, art. 7, is
generally coextensive with the equivalent guarantee in the United States
Constitution, and imports similar methods of analysis.”112 The court’s
statement just two years later, in Baker, that for the past seventeen years
(since Ludlow) it had really not been following the structured, multitiered federal equal protection standard of review is obviously erroneous.
Justice Dooley, who declined to join the majority opinion, noted this
defect and took the majority to task for it in his separate concurring
opinion.113 He began by stating that he feared that the rationale of the
majority opinion might be “ignored” in the future,114 a prediction which
336, 347 (Vt. 1982) (in criminal case involving questions of search, seizure, and confession Ludlow
is cited for the principle that “the meaning of the Vermont Constitution is [not] identical to the
federal document,” and sometimes has been construed “as protecting rights which were explicitly
excluded from federal protection.”); In re E.T.C., 449 A.2d 937, 939 (Vt. 1982) (Ludlow cited for
proposition that Vermont Constitution may be interpreted differently than U.S. Constitution).
109. See, e.g., Choquette v. Perrault, 569 A.2d 455, 459 (Vt. 1989) (summarizing holding of
Ludlow as selective Sunday Closing law “did not serve ‘an appropriate and overriding public
interest,’ nor did the State establish that the infringement of the rights of the citizens was merely
incidental and that the objectives of the law could be reached in no other way”) and id. at 460
(Ludlow stated that “virtually all regulatory statutes have disparate effects on various sectors of the
public”); Wolfe v. Yudichak, 571 A.2d 592, 602 (Vt. 1989) (Ludlow says almost all economic
legislation tends to have disparate impact).
110. See, e.g., J.L. v. Miller, 817 A.2d 1, 5 (Vt. 2002) (Ludlow shows that “[c]ourts have a
duty to refrain from interfering with the sovereign powers of the legislature as allocated by the state
constitution.”); In re Hill, 545 A.2d 1019, 1024 (Vt. 1988) (Ludlow cited for principles of separation
of powers and judicial self-restraint); Choquette, 475 A.2d at (Vt. 1984) (Ludlow cited for principle
that a statute is presumptively constitutional if “[o]n its face, the statute is not unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious, nor is it devoid of a public purpose.”); Langle v. Kurkul, 510 A.2d 1301, 1310 (Vt.
1986) (Ludlow held that “[s]tate courts . . . have a duty of judicial restraint which encompasses . . .
deference to legislative exercise of the sovereign power allocated to that body by the state
constitution”).
111. 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997).
112. Id. at 395 (emphasis added) (citing Lorrain v. Ryan, 628 A.2d 543, 550 (Vt. 19993) and
State v. George, 602 A.2d 953, 957 (Vt. 1991).
113. Baker, 744 A.2d at 889-97 (Dooley, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 889.
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my research of the case law citing Baker fully validates. He noted that
“[u]ntil this decision” Vermont cases had recognized a distinction in the
standard of “Common Benefits” Clause analysis applied to claims for
protection of basic civil rights triggered a higher level of scrutiny than
mere economic regulation.115 He noted that throughout the twentieth
century “the jurisprudence in Vermont is similar to that of most
states.”116 He faults the majority’s collapsing the “Common Benefits”
Clause analysis into one standard higher than generally applied under the
Equal Protection Clause because in so doing “the majority makes
statements entirely contrary to our existing Article 7 jurisprudence.”117
Again, my research fully confirms this criticism. Justice Dooley notes
that by so doing, the majority “overrul[es] a long series of precedents”
that used multi-tiered, structured “Common Benefits” Clause analysis.118
He criticizes the court’s description of one case as “neither fair nor
accurate,”119 and because it means that there is “no higher burden to
justify” racial discrimination than discrimination against large retail
stores, “the new standard” of analysis is not “required by, or even
consistent with, the history on which the court bases it.”120 He finds
“great irony” that the court adopts a higher standard of review which will
result in less deference to the legislature.121 He also asserts that the
majority mischaracterized the “Common Benefits” Clause precedents by
stating that they “reflect a very different approach” from federal equality
jurisprudence (noting several recent cases where the court said the
standard of review “is the same” as under federal precedents.)122 He
chides the majority for relying on “isolated statements” from Ludlow and
squarely accuses the Baker majority of creating “a new, more active”
standard of “Common Benefits” Clause review, rather than applying the
established standard.123 The majority’s statement that the new activist
standard has been consistently applied in the past is simply
“incredible.”124
To bolster its analytical approach, the majority discusses the text of
the “Common Benefits” Clause. Although Chief Justice Amestoy has
much to say about the philosophy, purpose and importance of textual
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 890.
Id. at 891.
Id. at 893 (emphasis added).
Id. at 893 (emphasis added) (citing nine cases).
Id. at 894, n.1 (emphasis added).
Id. at 894 (emphasis added).
Id. at 894.
Id. at 894.
Id. at 895 (emphasis added).
Id. at 895, n.3 (emphasis added).
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analysis, he seems to be at a total loss when it comes to actually
engaging in textual analysis. He concludes that “chief” among the
principles expressed “is the principle of inclusion.”125 However, he
provides no comparison with how the critical terms of the “Common
Benefits” Clause were used in other documents of the period when the
“Common Benefits” Clause was adopted, and no elucidation of the
etymology of the terms. The majority’s plentiful ruminations are a poor
substitute for meaningful textual analysis. The abstract generality of the
principle (inclusion) discerned as the “core value” of the “Common
Benefits” Clause adds little value to legal analysis, though it lays the
foundation for several subsequent rhetorical flourishes the majority
relishes. Likewise, the majority’s review of the “historical context,”
while providing a very interesting review of the history of the “Common
Benefits” Clause, and of the egalitarian impulses unleashed by the War
of Independence,126 seems aimless and contributes little to the analysis of
the question before the court.127 It provides only a very superficial
examination of the purpose of the “Common Benefits” Clause128 and
fails in any depth to relate that purpose to the institution of marriage.129
In the section on “Analysis Under Article 7,” the court primarily
summarizes the analysis it has distilled in the previous sections. A
“relatively uniform standard, reflective of the inclusionary principle at its
core, must govern” and “the rigid, multi-tiered analysis evolved by the
federal courts under the Fourteenth Amendment” is rejected.130 The
group claiming exclusion must be defined, but not classified (such as
“suspect”) because classification of the group “has never provided a
stable mooring” for the “Common Benefits” Clause, and because such
labeling is inherently subjective and unpredictable.131 The government’s
statutory purpose must be examined to determine whether the
discrimination “is reasonably necessary to accomplish the State’s

125. Id. at 875 (majority opinion).
126. Id. at 877 n.3.
127. The conclusion is that the “Common Benefits” Clause was aimed at “the elimination of
artificial governmental preferments and advantages.” Id. at 877.
128. “No phrase except ‘liberty’ was invoked more often by the Revolutionaries than ‘the
public good.’ It expressed the colonists’ deepest hatreds of the old order and their most visionary
hopes for the new. . . . [They believed] that ‘all government . . . is or ought to be, calculated for the
general good and safety of the community . . . . ‘The word republic’ said Thomas Paine, ‘means the
public good, or the good of the whole . . . .’” GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 55 (1969).
129. For an example of a how the history of marriage related to republic theories of the
founding era (which the Baker opinion fails to grasp), see NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS, A
HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION, at 9-23 (2000).
130. Baker, 744 A.2d at 878.
131. Id. at 878, n.10.
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claimed objectives,” in light of “the significance of the benefits and
protections of the challenged law,” the promotion of the government’s
goals, and the under or over-inclusiveness of the classification. 132
Because that process involves imprecise “reasoned judgment,” the court
is compelled to exercise restraint and to show respect for tradition.133
Justice Dooley’s separate opinion notes that the one-high-standard
approach for many years allowed courts in other jurisdictions to strike
down social and economic legislation the judges disliked, and he laments
the adoption of such an activist standard of review.134 He also
condemned the subjectivity of the new standard of review “that relies
wholly on factors and balancing, with no mooring in any criteria or
guidelines, however imperfect they may be.”135 The new standard “is not
at all predictable [and] [i]n the end, the approach the majority has
developed relies too much on the identities and personal philosophies of
the men and women who fill the chairs at the [Vermont] Supreme Court,
too little on ascertainable standards . . ., and very little, if any, on
deference to the legislative branch.”136 The “final irony” of the new test
“is that the balancing and weighing process . . . describes exactly the
process we would expect legislators to go through . . . . We are judges,
not legislators.”137 Likewise, Justice Johnson, in her partially dissenting
opinion, noted her “concerns about the test that the majority devises to
review equal protection challenges under the Common Benefits
Clause.”138 Justice Johnson agrees with Justice Dooley’s criticisms of the
new standard of “Common Benefits” Clause analysis because “[t]he
Chancellor’s foot is not a promising basis for antidiscrimination law.”139
C. Application of “Common Benefits” Clause Standard
The two justices who wrote separate opinions in Baker criticized the
analytical approach of the majority because of its potential for
subjectivity, and the actual application of that standard by the majority
clearly validates that criticism. The majority opinion first noted that the

132. Id. at 878-79 (whether the discrimination “bears a reasonable and just relation to the
government purpose”).
133. Id. at 879.
134. Id. at 896 (Dooley, J. concurring) (“We have wisely, in the past, avoided the path the
majority now chooses, a path worn and abandoned in many other states.”). Id. at 895.
135. Id. at 897.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 907-08, n.13 (Johnson, J., dissenting in part).
139. Id. (citing Cass Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 478
(1996)).
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category excluded from marriage was same-sex couples.140 Then it
addressed the major justification for the exclusion, the link between
marriage, procreation, and childrearing. The court rejected the marriageprocreation-childrearing link for four reasons: infertile male-female
marriages, artificial reproduction technology and practices, legalized
adoption by gay couples, and substantial child-rearing by same-sex
couples. However, these assertions evade rather than address the critical
claim the State propounded.
The majority had trouble remembering (perhaps understanding) the
primary government justification for limiting marriage to male-female
couples. It constantly switched that interest. The court first identified the
“principle purpose” offered by the State for this discrimination as
“furthering the link between procreation and childrearing.”141 The court
then stated that the State “has a legitimate and longstanding interest in
promoting a permanent commitment between couples for the security of
their children.”142 In so doing, the court subtly (perhaps unwittingly
rather than deviously) revised the state’s interest changing it from linking
procreation and childrearing, to linking couples and childrearing. Still
later, it again restated the state’s interest as to “legitimate children and
provide for their security,”143 again missing the critical procreation
element in the marriage-childrearing link. It only returned to the critical
marriage-procreation-childbearing link when stating it’s conclusion that
there was “extreme logical disjunction between the classification and the
stated purposes of the law – protecting children and ‘furthering the link
between procreation and child rearing’ . . . .”144 It immediately slipped
off target again stating that the state’s goal was “promoting a
commitment between married couples and to promote the security of
their children and the community as a whole . . . .”145 But it summarily
added that “[p]romoting a link between procreation and childrearing
similarly fails to support the exclusion.”146 The court also asserted that
the marriage classification was “significantly underinclusive” because
many married couples never intend to procreate and they have “no
logical connection to the stated government goal.”147
Next, the court cited sensational estimates that between six and
fourteen million children are being raised by gay fathers or lesbian
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Baker, 744 A.2d at 880 (majority opinion).
Id. at 881.
Id.
Id. at 882.
Id. at 884.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 881.
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mothers, and that between 1.5 million and five million lesbian mothers
resided with their children in the US in 1990.148 While there are no doubt
many same-sex couples raising children, the reference to such grossly
inflated data only undermines the credibility of the court’s opinion. The
court’s admission that “accurate statistics are difficult to obtain”149 is no
excuse for citing two of the most inflated reports and not any of the more
responsible estimates. While “there is no dispute that a significant
number of children” are being raised by same-sex partners,150 there is a
huge difference between a significant number in the thousands and a
significant number in the millions, and that difference apparently matters
to the court’s analysis because it felt compelled to cite the millions
estimates to make its point.
The court must have felt desperate to even mention such exaggerated
numbers. The exaggeration is shown by several census reports. The 2000
Census Report revealed that in 2000 (the year beginning just three days
after the Baker decision) there were a total of just under 5,500,000 adult
couples living together unmarried (5,475,768 unmarried partner
households).151 Of that number, only 301,026 were male householders
with male partners, and 293,366 were female householders with female
partners; in total, there were 594,392 same-sex couples reported by the
2000 Census, just fewer than 11 percent of the total population of
nonmarital cohabitants.152 To reach the minimal number of children
estimated as being raised in one irresponsible study cited by the Vermont
Supreme Court, all of the same-sex couples reported in the 2000 Census
would have to be raising children, and they would have to be raising
more than 10 children per couple; and they would have to be all raising
nearly thirty children per couple to reach the highest estimate of children
being raised by same-sex couples in that same study!
The most recent Census Report on the number of children living with
a parent and an unmarried partner reveals that 1,799,000 children are
living with their mother and her unmarried partner (both heterosexual
and homosexual), and 1,081,000 children are living with their father and
his unmarried partner (both heterosexual and homosexual), for a total of

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. 2002 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 48, table 49.
152. 2000 Census <http://www.census.gov> cited in WORLD CONGRESS OF FAMILIES
UPDATE, ONLINE! Vol. 03, Iss. 02 (15 Jan 2002). Likewise, the total nonmarital cohabitant
householder population including same-sex and heterosexual cohabitants, constituted only 5 percent
of all households in the United States in the 2000 Census, compared to 52 percent for married couple
households. 2000 Census. Id.
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2,880,000 children being raised by a parent and a nonmarital partner.153
Applying the proportion of heterosexual and same-sex nonmarital
cohabitant couples, eleven percent (11 %), suggests that only 317,000
children are being raised by same-sex couples. The Census Bureau also
reports that 2,570,000 children under 15 are living with a single parent
and his or her unmarried partner, including 2,101,000 POSSLQs
(Persons of the Opposite Sex Sharing Living Quarters) and 469,000
others.154 Even if all of these others were same-sex couples (and the
study explicitly rejects that because roommates, housemates and other
non-partners are included in that number), that would still amount to less
than 1/10th of the two middle estimates the Vermont Supreme Court
mentioned and 1/30th of the high estimate they stated. The 2000 Census
reportedly indicates that about 20 percent of gay couples and about onethird of lesbian couples are raising children.155
The latest Census Bureau report on adopted children, Adopted
Children and Stepchildren: 2000,156 shows that a total of 57,693 adopted
children are living with men or women with an unmarried partner. That
includes heterosexual nonmarital partners (who greatly outnumber samesex partners in the population) as well as same-sex partners.157 Applying
the generous 11 percent ratio found by the 2000 Census to estimate how
many of these children are living with same-sex couples, less than 6,350
adopted children are being raised by same-sex partners. The point is that
the Vermont Supreme Court in Baker egregiously stretched to insert
highly inflated data to try to support its point. That is neither good
statistical analysis, nor good legal analysis.
The court returned to the “reality” of child-rearing by same-sex
couples when it asserted that “the exclusion of same-sex couples from
the legal protections incident to marriage exposes their children to the
precise risks that the State argues the marriage laws are designed to
secure against.”158 That point is certainly relevant and worth considering
153. Jason Fields, Children’s Living Arrangements and Characteristics: March 2002, in
Current Population Reports (June 2003), at 2, Table 1, Children by Age and Family Structure,
March 2002, at <http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-547.pdf> (last visited August 28,
2003).
154. Fields, supra note 153 at 4, Table 2, Children under 15 Living With Mothers and Fathers
in Cohabiting-Couple Households: 2002, at <http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p20-547.pdf>
(last visited August 28, 2003).
155. Christopher Seeley, Gay Parents face back-to-school jitters, Southernvoice.com at
http://www.sovo.com/2003/8-8/news/localnews/gayparents.cfm (last visited August 28, 2003).
156. Census Bureau, Adopted Children and Stepchildren: 2000 <http://adoption.about.com/
gi/dynamic/offsite.htm?site=http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr%2D6.pdf>
and
<http://adoption.about.com/cs/resstatstrends/a/census2000.htm> (seen Sept. 16, 2003), cited in
William L. Pierce, Adoption Numbers, NRO, Guest Comment, August 27, 2003.
157. Id.
158. Baker, 744 A.2d at 882.
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with respect to another state interest — the interest in optimal childrearing or, as the State put it, “‘promoting child rearing in a setting that
provides both male and female role models.’”159 But it is not relevant to
assessing the propriety of restricting marriage to male-female couples to
promote the procreation-childrearing link.
The court concluded from these considerations that the marriage
statute “plainly excludes many same-sex couples who are no different
from opposite-sex couples with respect to these objectives.”160 Again, it
noted that “the marriage exclusion treats persons who are similarly
situated for purposes of the law differently.”161 It held that there was
“extreme logical disjunction between the classification and the stated
purposes of the law . . . .”162 These statements are bald conclusions
unsupported by facts, precedents, or analysis. Moreover, the purpose of
the law as to which the court sees male-female and same-sex couples
having no difference is not the purpose or state interest the court purports
to be discussing (the state’s interest in furthering the linkage between
procreation and child-rearing) but another interest (child welfare). Even
if same-sex couples satisfied the state’s interest in child-rearing and child
welfare just as well as did male-female couples (a separate and very
dubious proposition),163 on the issue of furthering the state’s interest in
establishing linkage between procreation and child-rearing that point is
irrelevant. Because same-sex couples cannot procreate at all, permitting
them to marry will not establish significant linkage between procreation
and childrearing.164
The procreation link was brushed aside because married couples can
use artificial reproductive technologies to generate children and “there is
no reasonable basis to conclude that a same-sex couple’s use of the same
technologies would undermine the bonds of parenthood, or society’s
159. Id. at 884 (quoting the State’s brief).
160. Id. at 882 (emphasis added).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 884 (emphasis added).
163. That basis for the court’s “no difference” conclusion with respect to the separate interest
of providing for the welfare of children is also very feeble, but that is a topic for another article.
164. It might be argued that allowing same-sex couples to marry would partially foster this
linkage because, for example, some lesbians might never undertake to bear and rear a child by
themselves, but with a same-sex marriage partner they would; so same-sex marriage would foster the
partial linkage because it would encourage such a lesbian to procreate and rear a child who is related
to her. However, this approach partially undermines the state interest in linking procreation and
child-rearing because it involves the deliberate exclusion of the other biological parent from the
marriage. The resulting child-rearing is distinguishable because the child is reared in a relationship
from which the other procreative parent has been deliberately excluded, denying the child the benefit
of dual-gender child-rearing. See Lynn D. Wardle, “Multiply and Replenish”: Considering Same-Sex
Marriage in Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 771, 80613 (2001) (discussing the Baker procreation analysis in similar terms).
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perception of parenthood.”165 But the court evaded the fact that often an
assisted reproduction technique is employed by married couples to assist
the couple to procreate—to have a child that is the genetic offspring of
both partners. Assisted reproduction never allows a same-sex couple to
procreate a child that is the genetic offspring of both partners. It still
takes a man and a woman to procreate.
The use of ART by married couples to imitate natural procreation
presents a dramatically different issue than the use of ART by same-sex
couples to obtain a child to raise. From the perspective of responsible
procreation, the attempt to bring children into a relationship that is in
form and kind and gender union the same as the procreative union can be
distinguished from the attempt to bring children into a homosexual
relationship of two men or two women. The court noted that “the reality
today is that increasing numbers of same-sex couples are employing
increasingly efficient assisted-reproductive techniques to conceive and
raise children.”166 However, this misstates the point and the mistake is
more than semantic. While same-sex couples may rear a child as a
couple, they cannot conceive a child as a couple . They cannot procreate
as a couple. They may contract with a person of the opposite sex, and
with that person one member of the same-sex couple may procreate for
the purpose of producing a child that both partners plan to raise together;
but the same-sex couple cannot as a couple procreate—with or without
assisted reproduction technology. Some ART may help married couples
to procreate (artificial insemination using the husband’s sperm, in vitro
fertilization using the wife’s egg and husband’s sperm, etc.). In those
cases, ART furthers the linkage between procreation and child-rearing.
The fact that some nonmarital male-female couples may also procreate
using ART tells us nothing about marriage law or whether an exception
should be made to marriage laws that historically have furthered that
state interest; it only tells us that in the context of dealing with
childlessness and infertility, lawmakers have determined that the state
interest in linking child-rearing and procreation is partially subordinate to
other important interests (e.g., allowing responsible persons to bear and
rear children who are at least partially related genetically to them or their
spouse or partner). It provides no guidance regarding whether, in the
marriage context, the state’s possible interest in promoting or favoring
same-sex unions outweighs the state’s interest in preserving marriage as
an institution that fosters the linkage between procreation and childrearing.

165. Baker, 744 A.2d at 882.
166. Id.
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The court noted that there is no indication that married couples’ use
of ART technologies has “undermine[d] a married couple’s sense of
parental responsibility, or foster[ed] the perception that they are ‘mere
surplusage’ . . . .”167 But the issue before the court was not whether
allowing same-sex couples to use assisted reproduction technology
undermines the bonds of parenthood, or society’s perception of
parenthood,168 but whether allowing same-sex couples to marry
undermines the linkage between procreation and child-rearing. However,
the fact that state lawmakers may have chosen to partially subordinate
the state interest in linking child-rearing and procreation in order to
promote another state interest (allowing the procreation of children who
are partially related to the parents) hardly compels the conclusion that the
State must always subordinate its primary interest, or that the states may
not preserve marriage as the institution which best fosters the linkage
between procreation and child-rearing. The contexts are different (as
marriage differs from ART) and the strength of the competing policies
differ.
The majority, again, apparently misunderstood the real state interest.
The court apparently believed the goal of the law was to exclude from
marriage all those who cannot procreate.169 However, the State never
said that the purpose of its law was to exclude non-procreative couples;
rather its purpose was inclusive, to “further[] the link between
procreation and child rearing” by extending the benefits and status of
marriage to those who are capable or may be capable of both procreation
and child-rearing.170 Of course, since no same-sex couple is capable of
procreating, including same-sex couples in marriage could not further the
link between procreation and child-rearing.171
Likewise, the state did not assert that the purpose of the marriage
restriction (to male-female couples) was that every married couple
procreates. Rather, the purpose of the law restricting marriage to malefemale couples was to further the linkage between procreation and childrearing. It does that by restricting marriage to couples in categories
capable of doing both.

167. Id.
168. They already can and do use ART; whether as a matter of policy that should be allowed
or may be prohibited is an issue for another case and another day.
169. Thus, the court incorrectly criticized the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage for
being “underinclusive” (not overinclusive). Baker, 744 A.2d at 881. It would only be underinclusive
if the purpose of the law was to exclude non-procreative couples.
170. Id.
171. See generally Wardle, “Multiply and Replenish,” supra note 164, at 811-13 (2001)
(similar analysis).
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Allowing male-female couples to marry, even those who cannot or
will not procreate, conveys a message that links marriage with
procreation because, as a general category of unions (contrasted with
same-sex unions), male-female unions are capable of human procreation
(and most do procreate). Same-sex couples cannot ever procreate.
Allowing same-sex couples to marry would not further the state’s
interests in linking procreation and child-rearing because same-sex
couples are categorically incapable of procreation as couples.
The majority also discussed “the history and significance” of
marriage, concluding that its main significance was in providing the
parties with “significant public benefits and protections,”172 listing more
than a dozen statutory benefits extended to married couples.173 It
summarily concluded without analysis that limiting those benefits to
male-female couples did not further any of the states’ seven asserted
justifications.174
Three times the Baker majority refers to the fact that the Vermont
legislature has legalized adoptions by gay and lesbian couples, and
extended child contact and child support laws to cover same-sex couples,
to support its conclusion that limiting marriage to male-female couples
violates the “Common Benefits” Clause.175 This seems more than a little
disingenuous inasmuch as the legislature did not act to authorize samesex couples to adopt until after the Vermont Supreme Court had ruled
that the former statute needed to be interpreted that way because “[t]here
is no reason in law, logic or social philosophy to obstruct” same-sex
couples from adopting,176 and to do so is “inconsistent with the children’s
best interests . . . .”177 The court’s concealment of the judicial “nudge”
behind the policy extension at least taints the reference to the adoption
laws as manifestation of a bona fide indication of Vermont citizens’
public policy. Nor does the court acknowledge that the policy issue
concerning whether to allow same-sex couples to adopt children who are
missing and in need of one or both parents is quite different than the
policy issue whether to allow same-sex couples to marry. As a method of
addressing the needs of children, to allow same-sex adoption provides a
significantly different and potentially more prudent deviation from

172. Baker, 744 A.2d at 883.
173. Id. at 884.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 882, 885, and 886.
176. In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt. 1993) (quoting In re Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997,
1002 (Sur.Ct.1992)).
177. In re B.L.V.B. 628 A.2d at 1276. See also id. at 1273 (the court must “avoid results that
are irrational, unreasonable or absurd”).
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history and social mores than to more broadly legalize same-sex
marriage.
The modification of the Vermont adoption law certainly is a relevant
point because allowing same-sex couples to adopt shows that inclusion
of same-sex couples in child-rearing does not necessarily damage
irreparably the state interest in promoting the connection between
procreation and child-rearing. Moreover, the fact that for over a hundred
years Vermont has permitted adoption to occur and that it has not
irreparably damaged the linkage between procreation and child-rearing—
many people still procreate to produce the children they rear, and there is
no evidence that substantial numbers of fertile couples forego
procreation because they can adopt instead—shows that some exception
to the policy linking procreation and child-rearing is possible that does
not significantly undermine the policy. Unfortunately, it does not help us
discern whether legalizing same-sex marriage would, similarly, fail to
undermine the state’s interest in linking procreation and childrearing.
That same-sex couples may adopt tells us something about adoption but
very little about marriage. Adoption is for the benefit of children for
whom the linkage of procreation to child-rearing has already failed, so it
makes no sense to evaluate any adoption law in terms of the state interest
in fostering that linkage. All adoptions (regardless of the sexual
preferences of the adopter) defy this linkage by allowing an adult or
adults who did not procreate a child to formalize a child-rearing
relationship and legal parental status. Thus, it is senseless to use adoption
law—which operates when the linkage has failed—as a tool to evaluate
whether to revise marriage law—which operates to support the linkage—
to permit marriage by same-sex couples who are categorically incapable
of procreation. Perhaps one reason that adoption (even by gay couples)
has not eroded the linkage is that the law limiting marriage to malefemale couples still reinforces that link by preserving a powerful cultural
and social institution that perpetuates the linkage. The fact that adoption
laws may allow same-sex couples to adopt in order to assist some
children who are in need of adoption tells us very little about marriage or
marriage policy, which exists to further different state purposes (at least
one of which, the linkage of procreation to child-rearing, no adoption can
further).178
The main problem with the court’s “analysis” of the interest in
linking procreation and child-rearing is that it contains virtually no
analysis of that state interest (unless evasion and redundancy count as

178. See generally, Lofton v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Children & Family Services, 358 F.3d 804 (11th
Cir. 2004).
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analysis). The court dutifully listed some of the State’s arguments, but
then consistently failed to engage those arguments, and recast and
distorted the one state interest it tried to evaluate instead of engaging and
confronting it.
Finally, the court rejected the history of criminal prohibition of
same-sex relations suggesting that it was “motivated by an animus
against a class,” reflected outmoded “eighteenth-century standards,” and
because (more significantly) recent Vermont legislation repealed fellatio
laws, prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and
barred “hate crimes.”179 The court concluded this section noting that
there was “no reasonable and just basis” for exclusion of same-sex
couples from the benefits of marriage.180 However, those reforms reflect
the movement to tolerate private, consensual homosexual conduct, rather
than to give homosexual unions preferred (marital) status.
Two justices agreed with the result of the majority’s analysis, but
declined to endorse the analysis. Justice Dooley insisted that suspect
classification analysis was appropriate and declined to endorse the
majority rationale.181 Justice Johnson, concurring in part and dissenting
in part, based her conclusion that Vermont marriage law violated the
Vermont Constitution on sex discrimination grounds instead of the
majority’s analysis.182
Crucially, the majority failed to apply one critical element of the
standard of analysis they purported to set: to exercise restraint and to
show respect for established legal institutions and thousands of years of
social tradition.183
D. Remedy
While the plaintiffs sought marriage licenses by declaratory and
injunctive relief, the court held only that the plaintiffs were entitled “to
obtain the same benefits and protections afforded by Vermont law to
married opposite-sex couples.”184 Noting that a number of statutory
schemes might be enacted which would provide plaintiffs the equal
179. Baker, 744 A.2d at 885-86.
180. Id. at 886.
181. Id. at 896 (Dooley, J. concurring). “We have wisely, in the past, avoided the path the
majority now chooses, a path worn and abandoned in many other states.” Id. at 895. Justice Dooley’s
opinion exemplified solid legal analysis, but it proceeded from a flawed assumption about suspect
classification.
182. Id. at 907-08, n.13 (Johnson, J., dissenting in part). Justice Johnson’s feminist gender
discrimination analysis of marriage as a repressive, male-favoring institution panders to the radical
feminist audience, but is more notable for its ideological stance than its credible legal analysis.
183. Id. at 879 (majority opinion).
184. Id. at 886.
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protection to which the court concluded they were entitled, the court left
it to the legislature to craft appropriate remedial legislation in order to
avoid “disruptive and unforeseen consequences” and “uncertainty and
confusion” that might flow from a judicial decree.185 It rejected the
dissenter’s charge of abdication, reemphasizing that the court did not
hold that plaintiffs were entitled to a marriage license, only to equal
benefits and protections.186 Decisiveness should not be confused with
wisdom, nor is the court the only repository of wisdom; courts “do best
by proceeding in a way that is catalytic rather than preclusive . . . .”187
The majority’s discussion of the remedy is interesting because, rather
than granting a remedy, it identified the range of remedies that would be
constitutional and turned the crafting of a remedy over to the legislature
which then provided a remedy the plaintiffs did not seek. Only Justice
Johnson dissented from this remedial approach. She concluded that the
court was abdicating its responsibility by not issuing a decree to permit
same-sex marriages.188 She compared the need to provide prompt redress
for denial of the right to marry to the need for prompt action to protect
racial minorities’ civil rights,189 and of issuing a mere “advisory opinion”
instead of fulfilling its judicial responsibility to obey the “commands of
our constitution.”190
The court concluded with a stirring rhetorical flourish. “The
extension of the Common Benefits Clause to acknowledge plaintiffs as
Vermonters who seek nothing more, nor less, than legal protection and
security for their avowed commitment to an intimate and lasting human
relationship is simply, when all is said and done, a recognition of our
common humanity.”191 Interestingly, this could have been said by a court
rejecting plaintiffs’ claims. That is, if it were only a matter of
recognizing common humanity, there surely are many ways to
accomplish that without legalizing and extending to same-sex unions the
highly unique and preferred status, benefits, and protections afforded
marriage.

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 887.
Id.
Id. at 888.
Id. at 899-904 (Johnson, J. dissenting in part).
Id. at 901-04.
Id. at 904.
Id. at 889 (majority opinion).
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V. HOW BAKER MAY BE LIMITED AND AVOIDED, AND WHY FUTURE
CLAIMS FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN THE UNITED STATES ARE LIKELY
TO IMITATE BAKER
A. How Baker May Be Distinguished
There are a number of bases for distinguishing and limiting Baker
that would lead one to rationally conclude that Baker is likely to have
little influence in other courts. First, textually, very few other states have
a “Common Benefits” Clause in their constitutions.192 Second, the Baker
court notes that its “Common Benefits” Clause “was borrowed verbatim
from the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, which was based, in turn,
upon a similar provision in the Virginia Declarations of Rights of
1776.”193 Yet the dramatically expansive construction of the 222-yearold “Common Benefits” Clause of the Vermont Constitution by the
Baker court stands in stark contrast to the interpretation of “Common
Benefits” clauses in other state Constitutions.
Third, the Vermont Supreme Court emphasized that the Vermont
“Common Benefits” Clause “differs markedly from the federal Equal
Protection Clause” not only in its origins, history and language, but also
in its “purpose and development.”194 Cases interpreting the “Common
Benefits” Clause, it declared, “reflect a very different approach from

192. See, e.g., N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 10 (“Government being instituted for the common
benefit, protection, and security, of the whole community, and not for the private interest or
emolument of any one man, family, or class of men; therefore, whenever the ends of government are
perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual,
the people may, and of right ought to reform the old, or establish a new government. The doctrine of
nonresistance against arbitrary power, and oppression, is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good
and happiness of mankind.”); TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 2 (“That government being instituted for the
common benefit, the doctrine of non- resistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd,
slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.”); VA. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (“That
government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the
people, nation, or community; of all the various modes and forms of government, that is best which
is capable of producing the greatest degree of happiness and safety, and is most effectually secured
against the danger of maladministration; and, whenever any government shall be found inadequate
or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community hath an indubitable, inalienable, and
indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to
the public weal.”); W.VA. CONST. art. 3, § 3 (“Government is instituted for the common benefit,
protection and security of the people, nation or community. Of all its various forms that is the best,
which is capable of producing the greatest degree of happiness and safety, and is most effectually
secured against the danger of maladministration; and when any government shall be found
inadequate or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community has an indubitable,
inalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter or abolish it in such manner as shall be judged
most conducive to the public weal.”).
193. Baker, 744 A.2d at 875.
194. Id. at 870 (emphasis added).

10WARDLE.MACRO

346

5/25/2004 11:35 PM

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 18

current federal jurisprudence.”195 The court emphasized that the
“Common Benefits” Clause could be (and had been) interpreted to
“provide more generous protection to rights . . . than afforded by the
federal charter.”196 Thus, attempts to import the Baker rationale into
Equal Protection Clause analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment, or
under similar equality provisions of state constitutions, will find it
difficult to bridge the uniqueness and distinctiveness gap which the
Vermont Supreme Court emphasized and heavily relied upon in Baker.
Fourth, the weakness of the critical analysis in Baker certainly
should limit (and to this point apparently has limited) the precedential
influence of the decision. The majority analysis is, as Judge Dooley
predicted, little more than an ipse dixit.197 The feeble legal analysis of the
majority opinion was not the result of incompetence of the justices.
Indeed, several parts of the Baker opinions show that the court was
clearly capable of disciplined, legitimate legal analysis.198 Rather, the
collapse of analysis in the Baker opinion resulted from judicial overreaching, haste, trying too hard to get to a predetermined political end
(and perhaps the desire to get there first), and perhaps trying to show off.
It was a defect of will, not skill, resulting from the triumph of personal
preference over the chafing restraints of the discipline of legal
analysis.199

195. Id. at 871 (emphasis added).
196. Id. at 870 (quoting State v. Badger, 450 A.2d 336, 347 (Vt. 1982)).
197. Latin for “he himself has said (it); hence, an arbitrary or dogmatic statement.”
WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 772 (1964).
198. For instance, the statutory analysis in the court’s opinion was careful, well-supported, and
consistent with precedent and theory. Baker, 744 A.2d at 868-69; see infra notes 81 through 89 and
accompanying text. Likewise, the majority’s rejection of the assertion (embraced by Justice Dooley)
that lesbians and gay men are a suspect class, if quite brief, was logical, appropriately cited and
followed numerous cases, distinguished others, and identified the practical inconsistency of that
approach. Id. at 878, n.10 (noting that it is a “‘less than exacting standard’ by which to measure the
prudence of a court’s exercise of its powers,” there is “less predictability in the outcome of future
cases,” and criticizing “[t]he artificiality of suspect-class labeling . . . .”). Similarly, the majority’s
rejection of the claim (embraced by Justice Johnson) that not allowing same-sex couples to marry
constitutes sex discrimination was incisive, well-supported, and logical, albeit very abbreviated. Id.
at 880, n.13 (noting that “marriage laws are facially neutral; they do not single out men or women as
a class for disparate treatment, but rather prohibit men and women equally from marrying persons of
the same sex,” distinguishing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1969) because the purpose of
antimiscegenation laws was to maintain racially discriminatory white supremacy, and distinguishing
discriminatory elements of long-repealed marriage-related statutes from evidence of discriminatory
purpose of surviving marriage laws).
199. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 984 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“It is not reasoned judgment that supports the Court’s decision; only personal
predilection.”).
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B. Why Baker Is the Probable Shape of the Future in Some States
While Baker can and should have (and to date has had) very little
impact on legal analysis generally, and the analysis of same-sex marriage
claims in particular, there are implications that the Baker result is the
new direction of the movement for legalization of same-sex marriage. It
is the likely outcome of same-sex marriage litigation in at least a few
other states.
First, some of the leading advocates of same-sex marriage endorse
establishment of same-sex civil unions or domestic partnership instead of
marriage as an incremental step toward ultimately legalizing same-sex
marriage. For example, Profession William N. Eskridge, in his book
Equality Practice, Civil Unions and the Future of Gay Rights,
recommends a strategy that he calls equality practice—”equality for
lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and their relationships is a liberal right for
which there is no sufficient justification for state denial—but it is not a
right that ought to be delivered immediately, if it would unsettle the
community.”200 Thus, like the Vermont Supreme Court in Baker,
Professor Eskridge distinguishes between immediate recognition of
rights for same-sex couples, and provision of specific remedies, such as
same-sex marriage. He sees this approach as having the advantage of
“recogniz[ing] the need to accommodate new ideas and the inability of
human beings and their communities to do so without a long process of
education and personal experience.”201 The Vermont marriage-equivalent
“civil unions statute is not equality,” notes Eskridge, but “ it is at least
equality practice.”202 This “incremental” process is much more likely to
produce permanent transformation of society’s attitudes about same-sex
relationships.203
A compromise approach is also recommended by respected
conservative Judge Richard Posner. Instead of legalizing same-sex
marriage, he opines that same-sex domestic partnerships should be
created to give a marriage-like status to same-sex unions while
preserving the status of marriage for male-female couples. Several years
before Baker he suggested:
[S]ince the public hostility to homosexuals in this country is too
widespread to make homosexual marriage a feasible proposal even if it
is on the balance cost-justified, maybe the focus should be shifted to an

200. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, EQUALITY PRACTICE, CIVIL UNIONS AND THE FUTURE OF GAY
RIGHTS at xiii (2002).
201. Id. at xv.
202. Id. at 148.
203. Id.
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intermediate solution that would give homosexuals most of what they
want . . . .Denmark and Sweden, not surprisingly, provide the model.204

With the combined support of leading liberal intellectuals, like
Professor Eskridge, and conservative intellectuals, like Judge Posner, it is
not unlikely that most individual intellectuals as well as the institutions
in which intellectuals have significant influence, will exert increasing
pressure to legalize same-sex unions and giving them essentially the
same legal rights and benefits as marriage, but calling them by some
other label.
Second, the distinction between marriage and some marriage-like
status is one of the subtexts that can be found in the recent holding of the
Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas.205 There, the Supreme Court by 63 vote held that a Texas sodomy statute that criminally prohibited
homosexual (but not heterosexual) sodomy violated an unwritten
constitutional liberty of consenting adults to engage in private sexual
relationships. There were four opinions in the case; Justice Kennedy
wrote the majority opinion for five justices holding that the Texas
sodomy law violated substantive due process; Justice O’Connor wrote a
separate concurring opinion (which no one joined) arguing that the law
violated equal protection; Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion (joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas); and Justice Thomas
filed a short separate dissenting opinion.
The majority opinion in Lawrence was careful to explicitly note that
the issue before the Court did not involve marriage and the Court was not
mandating same-sex marriage,206 and the concurring opinion of Justice
O’Connor in dicta clearly indicated that the state had a valid basis for
limiting marriage to male-female couples.207 However, unlike
O’Connor’s concurring opinion, the majority opinion in Lawrence did
not clearly declare (in dicta) that the limitation of marriage to malefemale couples was justifiable under the Lawrence rationale, and to the
hints of the majority that the marriage issue could be viewed differently,

204. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 313-314 (1992).
205. 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
206. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (“The present case does not involve minors . . . . It does not
involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationships that homosexual
persons seek to enter.”). See also 123 S. Ct. at 2484 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
207. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488 (O’Connor, J., concurring), at 7 (slip op.) (Lawrence “does
not mean that other laws distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals would similarly fail
under rational basis review. Texas cannot assert any legitimate state interest here such as . . .
preserving the traditional institution of marriage. Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex unions –
the asserted state interest in this case – other reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage
beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group.”)
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the dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia bluntly warned: “Do not believe
it.”208 He noted that the rationale of the majority opinion
dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a
distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions,
insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned. If moral
disapprobation of homosexual conduct is “no longer a legitimate state
interest” for purpose of proscribing that conduct . . . and if, as the Court
coos (casting aside all pretense of neutrality), “[w]hen sexuality finds
overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct
can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring,” . . .
what justification could there possibly be for denying the benefits of
marriage to homosexual couples exercising “[t]he liberty protected by
the Constitution,” ibid.?209

Doctrinally, Justice Kennedy’s approach in Lawrence was
predictable from an extra-judicial philosophical perspective. He
essentially suggests that there is a distinction between the state regulation
(prohibition and punishment) of private sexual behavior and state
recognition or promotion of public status or benefits. His opinion
specifically holds that the State may not criminally punish private
homosexual behavior between consenting adults, and explicitly
distinguishes a number of situations in which public acts, benefits or
interests may be involved. This is the position taken by distinguished
Oxford and Notre Dame Natural Law philosopher, John Finnis,210 whose
position has been described by distinguished pro-gay-marriage Professor
William Eskridge as “friendly to decriminalizing consensual private
sodomy,”211 but opposing “same-sex marriage, antidiscrimination laws,
and other public stamps of approval for homosexuality.”212
The distinction between prohibiting sodomy and legalizing same-sex
marriage is made by arch-economic-analyst Richard Posner in his book,
Sex and Reason,213 a source that was cited prominently in the majority
opinion in Lawrence.214 Just as the Lawrence decision tracks the
208. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2498 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and
Thomas, J.).
209. Id.
210. See generally John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation,” 69 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1049, 1052-76 (1994) (decriminalization and privatization of homosexual behavior
justified but not public acceptance or promotion of nonmarital including homosexual sex); John M.
Finnis, Law, Morality and “Sexual Orientation,” 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 11, 28
(1995); See also John Finnis, Liberalism and Natural Law Theory, 45 MERCER L REV. 687, 697-98
(1994).
211. William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of AntiGay Discourse and
the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1349 (2000).
212. Id. at 1346.
213. Id. at 1346, 1349 (citing POSNER, supra n. 203 at 311-12).
214. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 1283. See also, id. at 2489 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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distinction between private sexual conduct and public marriage drawn by
Judge Posner, the end result of Lawrence is also indicated by Judge
Posner who (as above-noted) suggests in Sex and Reason that instead of
legalizing same-sex marriage, same-sex domestic partnership should be
created to give a marriage-like status to same-sex unions while
preserving the status of marriage for male-female couples.215 Thus, more
likely than laying the foundation for same-sex marriage, Lawrence seems
to lay the foundation for a ruling like the Vermont Supreme Court
decision in Baker v. State mandating the legalization of (at least) a
marriage-equivalent same-sex domestic partnership or civil union.
C. Avoiding Baker In Other States By Amending the State Constitution
The Baker decision could have been avoided if the Vermont
Constitution had been amended to protect the unique status and benefits
of marriage and the extension of them only to married male-female
couples. In at least four states, constitutional amendments have been
passed either in reaction to judicial rulings that seemed headed in the
direction of Baker or because of such rulings in other states. Voters in
Hawaii,216 Alaska,217 Nebraska,218 and Nevada219 overwhelmingly
approved constitutional amendments to prevent a Baker ruling in their
state (by nearly 70-30 margins). The people of Vermont have tried to
amend their constitution after Baker, but the constitutional amendment
215. POSNER, supra note 203 at 312-14.
216. The people of Hawaii repudiated same-sex marriage and approved a constitutional
amendment authorizing the legislature to limit marriage to the union of a man and a woman by a
vote of 69 percent to 29 percent. See David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawaii Marriage Amendment: Its
Origins, Meaning and Fate, 22 HAWAII L. REV. 19, 20 (2000) (citing See Mike Yuen, Same-Sex
Marriage Strongly Rejected, HONOLULU STAR-BULL., Nov. 4, 1998, at A1; Complete, Uncertified
Results of Hawaii’s General Election: State Constitution, HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Nov. 5, 1998, at
B3).
217. The people of Alaska repudiated same-sex marriage and approved a constitutional
amendment defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman by 68 percent to 32 percent.
<http://www.gov.state.ak.us/ltgov/elections/elect98/general/results.htm>. See generally Kevin G.
Clarkson, The Alaska Marriage Amendment: The People’s Choice on the Last Frontier, 16 ALASKA
L. REV. 213 (1999).
218. The people of Nebraska repudiated same-sex marriage and approved a constitutional
amendment defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman, and rejecting same-sex civil
unions or domestic partnerships in 2000 by 70 percent to 30 percent. Nebraska Secretary of State,
Statewide General Election 2000 Results, Number 416, For 477,571 [70.10%], Against 203667
[29.89%].
219. The people of Nevada repudiated same-sex marriage and approved a constitutional
amendment defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman twice, in two separate ballot votes
(required to ratify the constitutional amendment) by 70 percent to 30 percent in 2000. See ABC
News, 2000 The Vote, Nevada Real-Time Vote Results, <http://abcnews.go.com/
sections/politics/2000vote/general/nv.html> (seen 2 April 2002). See also Nevada Secretary of State
Dean Heller, Election Coverage and Reports, General Election, Nov. 7, 2000 at
<http://sos.state.nv.us/nvelection/nvelection.htm>; NEV. CONST. art. 1 § 21 (Michie Supp. 2003).
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process in Vermont is very anti-populist. It requires that a proposed
amendment be passed by majorities in both houses of the state legislature
in two successive sessions.220
Probably the most important lesson of the Baker decision is that our
courts are not immune from the temptation to engage in political policymaking in the guise of interpreting state constitutions. The founders of
our nation relied upon the constraints of precedent, legal analysis and
judicial integrity to keep the courts from becoming political
instruments.221 While those barriers have a pretty good track record
overall during the past two centuries, we live in different times, and the
pressures on the judiciary brought by advocates of same-sex marriage are
formidable. As Baker shows, the genteel constraints of professionalism,
tradition, process, and personal integrity may not suffice to prevent the
political abuse of judicial constitutional policy-making under such
pressures.
Constitutionalization of family law can occur by constitutional
amendment as well as by judicial decision. Protection for basic family
institutions in constitutions is not uncommon in the western world.222 For
220. Gil Kujovich, An Essay on the Passive Virtue of Baker v. State, 25 VT. L. REV. 93, 111
(2000) (“under the Vermont Constitution, the amendment process could not begin until 2003, would
require two votes of the General Assembly with an intervening election, and could not be completed
before 2005”).
221. THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 78 (Hamilton) at 471; id, No. 81 (Hamilton) at 484-85
(Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).
222. For example, the German Constitution provides: “Marriage and the family shall enjoy the
protection of the state.” GG Art. 6(1) (F.R.G). See also Mary Ann Glendon, Knowing the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1153, 1166 (1998) (noting that at the time
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several reasons, there are advantages to constitutionalizing family law at
the state level. A fundamental social institution like marriage should be
given constitutional protection at the level of the state constitution
(where the polis is more likely to develop a consensus, and where
minority voices can be accommodated better than at a national level).
While a baseline may need to be established in national constitutional
law, there are good reasons for states to enact constitutional protection
for the institution of conjugal marriage. An explicit state constitutional
amendment defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman
could prevent judicial excesses like the Baker decision from being
repeated in other states.

of the Universal Declaration, “[t]he idea that the family ‘is entitled to protection by society and the
State . . . had already appeared in several constitutions [noting France and Germany], and would
shortly appear in many others.”); Sarah Andrews, Protecting Privacy Through Government
Regulation, 2 SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 1 (2001) (“At the national level, the legal right to privacy is
included in the constitution of most countries. In many this is framed as a right to respect for the
home, family life and private correspondence.”); Albie Sachs, Constitutional Developments in South
Africa, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y. 695, 701 (1996) (“We also found it quite striking, in going
through the constitutions of various countries of the world, that some include the right to family life
and others do not. Pakistan has it; India does not. China has it; Taiwan does not; Singapore does not.
Germany has it; Austria does not. Belgium has a very indirect form of protection—privacy of the
family; the Netherlands has nothing at all.”).
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Appendix A
Law Review Articles Citing Baker v. Vermont
Compiled and reviewed by Justin W. Starr*
This reviewer examined a total of 266 law review articles to
determine how they treated the Vermont Supreme Court=s decision in
Baker v. Vermont. The articles were selected by AKeycite@-ing Baker v.
State using Westlaw and limiting the references to law review articles.
This was done for the last time in the first week of September, 2003. The
articles listed as positive either explicitly praised the decision, or made
arguments supportive of or in sympathy with those made in Baker. For
example, if the article was arguing in favor of same-sex marriage and
cited to Baker, regardless of the exact proposition which Baker is cited
for, it was counted as positive. The articles were classified solely upon
their internal content, and some articles were listed as neutral even
though other writings of the article author suggested that the author had a
positive or negative view of Baker. The overall results are:
Positive, Support Baker
- 139 articles
Positive, but not far enough - 28 articles
Neutral
- 71 articles
Negative, Criticize Baker - 27 articles
Abolish Marriage
- 1 article
TOTAL
- 266 articles
I. POSITIVE ABOUT BAKER B 139 ARTICLES
Patrick J. Dooley, Note, I Am Who I Am, Or Am I? A Comparison of
the Equal Protection of Sexual Minorities in Canadian and U.S. Courts:
Immutability Has Only Found a Home North of the Border, 17 ARIZ. J.
INT=L & COMP. L. 371 (2000).
Mark Strasser, Equal Protection at The Crossroads: On Baker,
Common Benefits and Facial Neutrality, 42 ARIZ. L. REV. 935 (2000).
Natalie Brown Michalek, Note, Littleton v. Prange: How Voiding
Transsexual Marriage Affects the Fundamental Right of Marriage, 52
BAYLOR L. REV. 727 (2000).
Lawrence Friedman & Charles H. Baron, Baker v. State and the
Promise of the New Judicial Federalism, 43 B.C. L. REV. 125 (2001).

* J.D. 2004, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University; research assistant to
Professor Lynn D. Wardle.
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Robert F. Williams, Old Constitutions and New Issues: National
Lessons from Vermont=s State Constitutional Case on Marriage of SameSex Couples, 43 B.C. L. REV. 73 (2001).
Debra Carrasquillo Hedges, Note, The Forgotten Children: SameSex Partners, Their Children and Unequal Treatment, 41 B.C. L. REV.
883 (2000).
Jennifer Wriggins, Marriage Law and Family Law: Autonomy,
Interdependence and Couples of the Same Gender, 41 B.C. L. REV. 265
(2000).
Ryan Nishimoto, Marriage Makes Cents: How Law & Economics
Justifies Same-Sex Marriage, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 379 (2003)
(reviewing ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS QUESTION IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW (2002)).
William D. Araiza, ENDA Before It Starts: Section 5 Of The
Fourteenth Amendment and the Availability of Damages Awards to Gay
State Employees Under the Proposed Employment Non-Discrimination
Act, 22 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1 (2002).
Kara S. Suffredini, Note, Pride and Prejudice: The Homosexual
Panic Defense, 21 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 279 (2001).
Sharmila Roy Grossman, Comment, The Illusory Rights of Marvin
V. Marvin for the Same-Sex Couple Versus the Preferable Canadian
Alternative-M. V. H., 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 547 (2002).
Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An
Overview of Women=s Rights and Family Law in the United States
During the Twentieth Century, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2017 (2000).
Maura I. Strassberg, The Challenge of Post-Modern Polygamy:
Considering Polyamory, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 439 (2003).
Mark Strasser, Some Observations About DOMA, Marriages, Civil
Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 363 (2002).
Greg Johnson, In Praise of Civil Unions, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 315
(2002).
Laurie A. Rompala, Note, Abandoned Equity and the Best Interests
of the Child: Why Illinois Courts Must Recognize Same-Sex Parents
Seeking Visitation, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1933 (2001).
Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Some Questions for Civil
Society-Revivalists, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301 (2000).
Taylor Flynn, Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include
Transgender Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation
Equality, 101 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 392 (2001).
Dale Carpenter, The Limits Of Gaylaw, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 603
(2000) (reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING
THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET (1999)).
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Julie Jones, Money, Sex, and the Religious Right: A Constitutional
Analysis of Federally Funded Abstinence-Only-Until-Marriage Sexuality
Education, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1075 (2002).
Mark Wolinsky, Stereotypes, Tolerance and Acceptance: Gay Rights
in Courts of Law and Public Opinion, 19 DEL. LAWYER 13 (2001).
Linda J. Lacey, The ATake Back Vermont Campaign@: A Classic
Case of Media Manipulation, 19 DICK. J. INT=L L. 435 (2001).
Scott C. Seufert, Going Dutch?: A Comparison of the Vermont Civil
Union Law to the Same-Sex Marriage Law of the Netherlands, 19 DICK.
J. INT=L L. 449 (2001).
Jay Michaelson, On Listening to the Kulturkampf, or, How America
Overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, Even Though Romer v. Evans Didn=t, 49
DUKE L.J. 1559 (2000).
David B. Wexler, Lowering the Volume Through Legal Doctrine: A
Promising Path for Therapeutic Jurisprudence Scholarship, 3 FLA.
COASTAL L.J. 123 (2002).
Julie A. Greenberg, When is a Man a Man, and When is a Woman a
Woman?, 52 FLA. L. REV. 745 (2000).
James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Natural Law and Natural Rights in
Constitutional Interpretation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2285 (2001).
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Relationship Between Obligations and
Rights of Citizens, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1721 (2001).
Sheldon Gelman, The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Minimalist, 89
GEO. L.J. 2297 (2001) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A
TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999)).
Edward Brumby, Note, What is in a Name: Why the European SameSex Partnership Acts Create a Valid Marital Relationship, 28 GA. J.
INT=L & COMP. L. 145 (1999).
Developments in the LawCThe Law of Marriage and Family,
Inching Down the Aisle: Differing Paths Toward the Legalization of
Same-Sex Marriage in the United States and Europe, 116 HARV. L. REV.
2004 (2003).
Andrew Koppelman, Why Gay Legal History Matters Gaylaw:
Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet. 113 HARV. L. REV. 2035 (2000)
(reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE
APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET (1999)).
Huong Thien Nguyen, Note, Irrational Prejudice: The Military=s
Exclusion of Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Service Members After Romer
v. Evans, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 461 (2001).
Glenn H. Reynolds & David B. Kopel, The Evolving Police Power:
Some Observations for a New Century, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 511
(2000).

10WARDLE.MACRO

356

5/25/2004 11:35 PM

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 18

Jessica A. Hoogs, Note, Divorce Without Marriage: Establishing a
Uniform Dissolution Procedure for Domestic Partners Through a
Comparative Analysis of European and American Domestic Partner
Laws, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 707 (2003).
Christopher D. Sawyer, Note, Practice What You Preach:
California=s Obligation to Give Full Faith and Credit to the Vermont
Civil Union, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 727 (2003).
Renee M. Scire & Christopher A. Raimondi, Note, Employment
Benefits: Will Your Significant Other Be Covered?, 17 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 357 (2000).
Pamela M. Jablow, Note, Victims of Abuse and Discrimination:
Protecting Battered Homosexuals Under Domestic Violence Legislation,
28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095 (2000).
Melanie D. Price, The Privacy Paradox: The Divergent Paths of the
United States Supreme Court and State Courts on Issues of Sexuality, 33
IND. L. REV. 863 (2000).
Mark E. Wojcik, et al., International Human Rights, 34 INT=L
LAWYER 761 (2000).
Denise C. Hammond, Immigration And Sexual Orientation:
Developing Standards, Options, and Obstacles, 77 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 113 (2000).
Casey L. Westover, The Twenty-Eighth Amendment: Why the
Constitution Should Be Amended to Grant Congress the Power to
Legislate in Furtherance of the General Welfare, 36 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 327 (2003).
Robert L. Brown, Expanded Rights Through State Law: The United
States Supreme Court Shows State Courts The Way, 4 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 499 (2002).
Linda Kelly, Marriage For Sale: The Mail-Order Bride Industry and
the Changing Value of Marriage, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 175 (2001).
Christopher Rizzo, Banning State Recognition of Same-Sex
Relationships: Constitutional Implications of Nebraska=s Initiative 416,
11 J.L. & POL=Y 1 (2002).
Audra Elizabeth Laabs, Lesbian ART, 19 LAW & INEQ. 65 (2001).
Eric K.M. Yatar, Defamation, Privacy, and the Changing Social
Status of Homosexuality: Re-Thinking Supreme Court Gay Rights
Jurisprudence, 12 LAW & SEXUALITY 119 (2003).
Tobin A. Sparling, All in the Family: Recognizing the Unifying
Potential of Same-Sex Marriage, 10 LAW & SEXUALITY 187 (2001).
Christopher S. Hargis, Note, Queer Reasoning: Immigration Policy,
Baker v. State of Vermont, and the (Non)Recognition Of Same-Gender
Relationships, 10 LAW & SEXUALITY 211 (2001).
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Jeremy Patrick, Comment, A Merit Badge For Homophobia? The
Boy Scouts Earn the Right to Exclude Gays in Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale, 10 LAW & SEXUALITY 93 (2001).
Katrina C. Rose, The Transsexual and the Damage Done: The
Fourth Court of Appeals Opens Pandora=s Box By Closing the Door on
Transsexuals= Right to Marry, 9 LAW & SEXUALITY 1 (2000).
Randall Blandin, Note, Baker v. Vermont: The Vermont State
Supreme Court Held that Denying Same-Sex Couples the Benefits and
Privileges of Marriage is Unconstitutional, 9 LAW & SEXUALITY 349
(2000).
Carlos A. Ball, Essentialism and Universalism in Gay Rights
Philosophy: Liberalism Meets Queer Theory, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
271 (2001) (reviewing LADELLE MCWHORTER, BODIES AND
PLEASURES: FOUCALT AND THE POLITICS OF SEXUAL NORMALIZATION
(1999) and DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, IDENTITY AND THE CASE FOR GAY
RIGHTS: RACE, GENDER, RELIGION AS ANALOGIES (1999)).
Mark Strasser, Toleration, Approval, and the Right to Marry: On
Constitutional Limitations and Preferential Treatment, 35 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 65 (2001).
Mark Strasser, Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions: On Meaning,
Free Exercise, and Constitutional Guarantees, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 597
(2002).
Elaine M. De Franco, Comment, Choice Of Law: Will a Wisconsin
Court Recognize a Vermont Civil Union?, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 251 (2001).
Peter M. Carrozzo, Tenancies in Antiquity: A Transformation of
Concurrent Ownership for Modern Relationships, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 423
(2001).
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Comparative Law and the Same-Sex
Marriage Debate: A Step-By-Step Approach Toward State Recognition,
31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 641 (2000).
M. R. Carrillo-Heian, Domestic Partnership in California: Is it a
Step Toward Marriage?, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 475 (2000).
Mae Kuykendall, Gay Marriages and Civil Unions: Democracy, The
Judiciary and Discursive Space in the Liberal Society, 52 MERCER L.
REV. 1003 (2001).
Susan E. Dalton, From Presumed Fathers to Lesbian Mothers: Sex
Discrimination and the Legal Construction of Parenthood, 9 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 261 (2003).
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 2062 (2002).
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